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Time to Teach?

Carl Anders Säfström*

Abstract

In order to make clear the very different ways in which time, as well as the relation between student and teacher takes shape and form within education this paper explore two archetypes of teaching: Socratic teaching and Sophist teaching. Here I analyse the distinctly different ways in which power and the organisation of the social sphere take place within each. Socratic teaching is shown to rely on a notion of time as reproduction, which involves reproducing the power structure of a certain social order of inequality. By contrast, Sophist teaching relies on a notion of time as the instantiation of change and equality in the present. The paper concludes with pinpointing that what is at stake in teaching is the possibility of a liveable life for all (Sophist) rather than only for some (Socratic).

Keywords*: archetypes; socratic teaching; sophist teaching; equality; liveable life.*

1. Introduction

In this paper, I will contrast two archetypes for different understandings of what teaching is, and precisely two archetypes for the understanding of time within teaching. The first archetype is built on Socrates teaching and the second on Sophists teaching. What will be explored in the first part of the paper specifically is how those archetypes, logically imply two quite different understandings of time, as well as a difference in the way in which the student is to emerge within such time. In the first part of the paper, I will argue that the teaching of Socrates implies a certain logic of time as reproduction over time, which tends to make the student measured against the (master) teacher, which leads to, a) that the goal of teaching is basically to make the student the same as the (master) teacher, and as such, b) reducing equality needed for democracy to sameness, while Sophist teaching relies on a logic in which teaching opens up for the possibility of difference and plurality, which make equality over difference possible, as a democracy of teaching.

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In the second part of the paper, I will be expanding on the critique of the archetype of teaching as reproduction, by attaching such archetype to Jacques Rancière's (1991) critique of a pedagogized society, in which pedagogy and teaching are integral to the reproduction of inequality, and a prime example of what is wrong with modernity. I will do this to show how teaching as reproduction implies certain understandings of not only time but also society as necessarily organised around inequality. I will also refer to Judith Butler (2015), who also argues that what is denied in a society built on inequality, is the possibility for the precarious populations to appear, that certain people are deemed as not existing as full members of the societies in which they live.

In a third section, I will argue for the Sophist archetype of teaching as an adversarial response to inequality. In developing this archetype I will discuss briefly the attempt of Biesta and Säfström (2011) in "A Manifesto for Education," to take time out of the equation altogether. Such move will be explored further by relating the discussion to the Sophist archetype of teaching, and to suggest that the way forward is to acknowledge the ambiguity of time within teaching, both as an expression of the very procedures of teaching as well as what signifies the relationship between teacher and student. Here I will particularly explore the critique of the logic of One, which both Rancière and Butler refers to, as well as, through Barbara Cassin (2016), to return to the Greek pagan understanding of the other as at least two, both human and god.

In conclusion, I will relate time to teach to the possibility of ambiguity, that is to the presence of the figure of Ambi-, that allows for the at least two, for difference, for a history of time. Such figure I will conclude places teaching as the instantiation of change, and in that sense both outside time as well as in time to teach, in changing the present order of things, rather than reproducing such order.

2. Two archetypes: Socratic teaching and Sophist teaching

In the following, I will contrast two archetypes for different understandings of what teaching is, and precisely two archetypes for the understanding of time within teaching. With archetype I will mean a particular form which contains socio-psychic realities as well as particular ways of organising practical life. I borrow the term from Jungian (Bishop, 2011) psychoanalysis since I understand the archaic types of teaching I will be exploring in this paper being formed as primitive mental images early on in Greek culture, that is present in the collective unconsciousness of today (Hughes, 1986). I am not discussing the idea of the unconscious *per see*, but rather understand the unconscious as a term speaking to layers within language itself (Wittgenstein, 1953[2001], Rorty 1980). The archaic forms are in that sense particular ways of talking about and being within teaching and education, which imply certain given relations of power, perceptions of time and its function, as well as assumptions of the very reality in which one make sense of ones doings. The archaic form gives meaning to how teacher and student are to interact for an

event to be called teaching, it sets the parameters for how a student, as well as a teacher him or herself, are to emerge as such on the scene.

I will explore and develop what I initially call the archaic form of Socratic teaching and the second form Sophist teaching. Or rather, the second form is contrasted with the first to make them both as clear as possible. That means also that for those forms to exist they do not need to be in their pure form, as I will try to develop them, but rather the forms and the characteristics they imply can be used to make sense of education and teaching in concrete situations in which such activities are to take place. As such, they work as ideal types for teaching.

The point from which I read those forms are not from philosophy but from the point of education, I read from within the tradition of the Sophists rather than from Socrates (and Plato). That is, I will follow Rorty (1980) in spirit, in what he called "edifying philosophy," but not, in not wanting to name his approach education; "education sounds a bit too flat" (Ibid.: 360) since regardless of how it sounds for Rorty, it is educational thought that he describes and argues for. That he does not want to name edifying philosophy education is ironically adding to my point in this paper, that education belongs to its mode of thinking largely ignored by philosophers, even if not by philosophy. What is essential for my standpoint is the distinction Rorty makes between philosophy on the one hand and edifying philosophy (educational thought) on the other, since such distinction also gives meaning to two quite different aims of education. Lets' I expand a bit on this, an edifying philosopher says Rorty (1989) "would like simply to offer another set of terms, without saying that these terms are the newfound accurate representations of essences (e.g. of the essences of 'philosophy' itself)" (Ibid.: 370). That is, with "Plato's' invention of philosophical thinking" (Rorty, 1980: 157) two things follows according to Rorty, firstly what is established in intellectual life is "the absolute difference between the eternal and the Spatio-temporal" (Ibid.: 307), meaning that the role of the philosopher was to reach and inhabit the eternal space of ideas, the essences of philosophy itself, from which power to rule others flow, and secondly that the Spatio-temporal world is inferior to the eternal space of ideas as well as people populating such world are deemed inferior. Such absolute split allows for Plato in his Republic, to claim each and everyone's fixed place in a natural hierarchy and absolute difference between the "philosopher-king" ruler and the ones ruled (Bloom, 1991). What is also important for my argument in this paper is that by so doing Plato's' philosopher king wipes out the possibility of human plurality within himself, says Arendt (2005: 37) while he establishes the plurality of the Spatio-temporal world as inferior and incomplete. I will call the ambition to erase the necessary pluralism of the Spatio-temporal world an Aristocratic principle[1].

1 I am aware of that Plato in many ways can be understood as writing against the Aristocracy of his time, he argues for a Republic, but in that argument, he tends to establish an absolute distinction of inequality, which I will call an Aristocratic principle.

If power flows from access to eternal ideas and only certain people under certain circumstances can reach this realm of power, education and teaching according to an Aristocratic principle is basically about the reproduction of the powers of such people. Teaching then needs to be directed to finding out who those people are. Teaching according to an Aristocratic principle is to confirm a privilege already taken for granted. Teaching then is not only directed to finding out who is worthy, but also that this worth is already considered being a capacity within certain people, who are considered to have the desired constitution, as being already someone particular in the society in which one lives. That is, teaching, according to an Aristocratic principle, is a process to differentiate between abilities and talents, which are *not* considered to be a consequence of teaching, but which are there already and teaching the process in which those abilities and talents are confirmed. Education here is understood as the reproduction of that which is already given, either by blood or by natural gifts. From such understanding follows that time within education is to be understood as being based on the reproduction of a certain privilege, as those privileges are what makes up culture as such, makes up what is considered real and therefore what is to guide the social organisation, privileges only possible to be embodied by certain people. It is an idea of time as the reproduction of the same over time, and the Aristocratic principle in education is to guide the establishment of the same over time. There is no change possible.

Socrates, the philosopher and teacher who as a character in Plato's writings at least in part, is channelled through Plato's' political project, which Jaeger (1943) discuss in a section called "The Socratic problem" (Ibid.: 17-27), is caught in a reproduction of something given rather than to be open for the new to be forming itself in the present order of things. That is, even if one could argue that according to Socrates everyone could reach the realm of eternal ideas, Socrates would be the one to judge when that would be the case, from a position of superiority and power of being there already, therefore always pointing out, in comparison, the other as ignorant (Todd, 2003: 28-30). Reproducing a Master – student relationship as one based on the reproduction of inequality. To be taught by Socrates is to be reminded of one's ignorance until one is ready to take on the same position as Socrates, it is a process of stultification and sameness. Equality itself becomes the reproduction of sameness rather than an expression of a certain relation with the other, as other, within a plurality of humankind. Plato's Socrates is not a, what I can understand, an edifying philosopher in the meaning given by Rorty above is not in the practice of education, but is a philosopher either in the exercise of realising and reproducing the eternal space of ideas, made clear through his method, and/or a teacher who fixates ignorance while confirming the position of the Master. Socratic teaching is in line with a process through which the power of the same is reinforced, reproduced by the exclusion of the Other (Ibidem; Levinas, 1969: 43).

The very idea of time within the archaic model of Socratic teaching excludes the other since his teaching is a reproduction of self-same at the heart of teaching following an Aristocratic principle. That is, an Aristocratic principle transforms human plurality within the Spatio-temporal world into mono-culture of Masters and ignorant ones. The teaching of Socrates implies a certain logic of time as reproduction over time, which tends to make the student measured against the (master) teacher, which leads to, a) that the goal of teaching is basically to make the student the same as the (master) teacher, and as such, b) reducing equality needed for democracy to sameness, while Sophist teaching relies on a logic in which teaching opens up for the possibility of difference and plurality, which make equality over difference possible, as a democracy of teaching.

When the Sophists claims that *areté* can be *taught*, that how one embodies culture is not inherited by blood, but can and also should, be taught to anyone they are radically opposed to Plato's ideas of the role of the philosopher as well as the order of the Aristocratic social sphere as such. The Sophists, as democrats argue instead that it is not a natural hierarchy determined ultimately by an eternal sphere of ideas, that is to motivate the social organisation, but rather they started with the equality they found in nature as well as between men (Jaeger, 1939: 324). Interesting in this context is also that one of the great Sophists Euripides (480-406 B.C.), in his many plays pictured this alternative democratic social order of equality by not only giving voice to men of lower standing but also pictured women as actors in their own lives. The Sophists did not understand "philosophy divorced from life" (Jaeger, 1939: 296) rather they started in and stayed within, the Spatio-temporal order of the world, in which they found equality as the most decisive condition for natural as well as social life.

For the Sophists, equality was not reduced to confirmation of power already in possession of the Master, but rather that which organises the relation between citizens in the democratic city-state (Ibid.: 323-324). For the Sophists, anyone could be taught anything, meaning that teaching was not to be confirming an essence already considered to be a property of certain people, but the process in which anyone is brought into the knowledge of the world in which he or she lives already. That is, education and teaching for the Sophist "came into existence in response to a practical need, not a theoretical and philosophical one" (Ibid.: 295). There is no separate space of eternal ideas to be clarified, and consequently no group of people with a divine right to represent those ideas, and as such naturally given position in society to rule all others. Rather, what needs to be taught for the Sophists is the very worldliness of the world, that we live here and now in a Spatio-temporal world in which the ideas are embodied within the life one lives. The Sophists "did not understand philosophy divorced from life" (Ibid.: 296), for them to be living here and now meant that education, basically was an ethical-political conceptualisation of lived, enacted, *paideia* (Ibid.: 300): Education as the *praxis* of (democratic) culture.

Since teaching, for the Sophists is not to confirm essence, but to educate how to move within an ethical-political contextualisation of the lived presence, it is also the case that it is possible to teach anyone anything. Which means, essentially that time is not given, as the reproduction of the same, but open-ended, time in education is a direction towards an ambiguous future and not repetition of the same over time. Teaching within a Sophist tradition of education then means that anyone can be taught, and that abilities and talents are not given before one is involved in the process of teaching, that is abilities and talents are not considered natural but contextual constructs related to the world in which one lives. The Sophist teacher then is not aiming at purifying essences, but to extend social relations across the plurality of the human condition in the actual Spatio-temporal world in which one lives, and to explore ways to secure social relations: That is, to extend social relations with those whom you may not know, or cannot know in full (Levinas, 1994; Todd, 2003). It aims at expanding the publicness of the public, not to restrict it to the already privileged ones. The archaic form of Sophist teaching then necessarily involves conceptions of equality and change directing social relations, and expansion of the public, not selection and restriction, and allows for a time as a relation and direction across difference rather than a reproduction of the same over time. Sophist teaching goes beyond establishing the absolute hierarchy of the ignorant and the Master as a condition for teaching, which does not exclude the authority of a teacher in a situation of teaching. The Sophist teacher is still a teacher, meaning that authority in education is not given beforehand, but verified in the act of teaching itself (Säfström, 2003).

3. The critique of the Socratic archetype of teaching as reproduction

In this second part of the paper, I will be expanding on the critique of the archetype of teaching as reproduction, by attaching such archetype to Jacques Rancière's (1991) critique of a pedagogized society, in which pedagogy and teaching are integral to the reproduction of inequality, and a prime example of what is wrong with modernity. For Rancière, a pedagogized society is a society in which experts and those in power explain for the people why society by necessity needs to be founded on inequality. Such structure of explanation is also to be found within schooling, maybe in its purest form, in which the teacher explains the world for the student as if the student did not live in the world already. As if the student to enter into the knowledge of the world need to confess to being ignorant, and in the process of explanation continuously are reminded of his or her ignorance. But also, says Rancière, the message, in this case, is also such that you are continuously reminded that you cannot reach knowledge without knowledge being handed to you by a teacher, the latter which is also the one to decide when you reach such knowledge of the world (that matters).

This structure of explanation continuously pushes people into a position of stultification says Rancière (1991), since the only thing that stands fast is the inability to think for yourself, and fixates the position of the explicator, who becomes a Master who inhabits an absolute point of power from which all other things can be judged, legitimized and reproduced. Such structure operates through schooling as well as other institutions through society says Rancière (1991), and points to how modern society is not only built on but continuously practice inequality rather than equality.

Such inequality has, among other things, and particularly through the neoliberal flooding of the psycho-social world (Berardi, 2017), rapidly increased social inequality of the liberal democracies affected (OECD, 2015). Judith Butler (2015) shows how the rapid increase of precariousness of large part of populations in Western democracies, is not accidental but directly related to not only how neoliberal economy works, but also to institutions responsible for the security and the stability of the social sphere. In an analysis of security policy, or rather what she called "the rationale for militarization" (Ibid.:16-18), Butler shows how such rationale is reliant on a distinction between the people on the one hand and the population on the other, between those whose bodies populate a territory and those who are also recognised as political subjects "the people" of a certain nation worthy to defend. That is, what is established is an absolute distinction between those who are to appear on the scene and are understood as valuable for society as a whole, and those who are ignored as more or less worthless, between those whose voices matters and those who cannot be heard, between those who inhabit the scene, and those who are not there, not really existing as full members of the society in which they live. It is a distinction between mere living and a liveable life (Butler, 2006, 2015).

A prime example of the institutionalisation of inequality is how bullying continuously takes place in schooling, not as an arbitrary consequence of schooling, but instead as its very way of functioning, bullying as a sharp divider of what and who matters in schooling and what and who doesn't. Interesting enough, bullying when discovered is often accompanied with surprise, haven't been seen, even though the victim of bullying repeatedly have been trying to be heard, to take place among those who matter (*Friendsrapporten*, 2017). Bullying is as such an example of how inequality is practised as a certain reality deciding who and what can take place on the scene, who can and cannot be seen and heard, and functions as a process of reproduction of certain established power structures over time. A reality that structures the very (im-)possibility of appearing as an actor in one's own life.

Butler (2020) describes something similar when it comes to racism. In discussing racism and power, through Foucault and Fanon Butler says:

> power is already operating through schemas of racism that persistently distinguish not only between lives that are more and less valuable, more and less grievable, but also between lives that register more or less empathetically as lives. (Ibid.:112)

That is, certain people, do not register as fully alive not really as lives, no longer part of the people, but precarious populations. Precariousness then, for Butler, is not only a socio-economical position but an existential threat to liveable life as such. People being placed in precariousness due to a produced reality of inequality, are not only passively silenced on the scene, but actively excluded from the scene altogether, from liveable life, from being a fully grievable life in the first place (Ibid.: 28). The violence afflicted on black lives in the US is an appalling example of how inequality is not only a matter of civil rights and duties, but fundamentally about who and what can appear as a full life that matters, as a life that is equally grievable beyond calculations of the value of that life (Ibid.:107). To have been entering the sphere of calculation is to already have been entering in a foundational inequality of lives that matters more or less, says Butler (Ibidem).

Inequality is therefore not only a socio-economic reality but a defining characteristic of this very reality in the first place. The Aristocratic principle is as such not only a principle for certain relations of inequality and reproduction of power within and through institutions, or institutionalising processes such as schooling but is rather established as the very reality as such. Education and teaching in this reality are aiming at the purification of (some) essences rather than at extensions of social relations across difference. If time is not the repetition of self-same over time, but signifying a possible change through shifting relations between self and other across difference, then the Aristocratic principle infuses no time in given realities, only reproducing the only reality of inequality.

In the next section, I will be exploring the logic of One, challenged by the logic of the at least two, to implode the aristocratic principle from within and to do some groundwork for education and teaching beyond the reproduction of inequality.

4. The Sophist archetype of teaching as an adversarial response to inequality

I start this section with a short reflection over the Manifesto for education (Biesta & Säfström, 2011), since one of the reasons for developing the manifesto was to respond to Rancière's critique of a pedagogized society, by taking time out of education. That is since Rancière (1991) seemed to equalize pedagogy with modernity (at least according to the introduction to the mentioned book), the manifesto was to show that such correlations were not grounded in educational thought *per see*, but rather in a misplaced understanding of pedagogy.

The manifesto, in taking time out, neither aimed at understanding pedagogy in terms of always better (as the inherent call of modernity tended to be), nor as to the reproduction of inequality through certain exploratory exercises, but rather to understand education as being an expression of

the very *praxis* of democratic culture, and as such as an expression of the interest in the freedom of the other rather than oneself (Biesta & Säfström, 2011). What was taken out was a particular understanding of time in education as internally linked to progress, to the always better of modern society, and particularly time as the reproduction of the Aristocratic principle within such an idea of progress. The Manifesto argued for the inherent historicity of education as other than the repetition of self-same, it moved beyond the trap of the Aristocratic principle and, what in this article been called Socratic teaching.

What is so valuable with the way the Sophists introduced educational thought in contrast to Socratic teaching, is that such thought was firmly grounded on equality, in principle, grounded in a democratic idea that radically opposes the Aristocratic principle of inequality. The Sophists understood that culture could and should be *taught*, that how one embodies the culture and carries society as an expression of *areté*, could be taught, in principle, to anyone.

Education, in teaching anyone *areté*, was about how to move in the world of others, it requires another logic than if the world was already there, determined, embodied only by a certain class of people, and repeated over time. Teaching for the Sophists is rather about how to move in the Spatio-temporal world in which one lives, a world populated by a multiplicity of others. Such a Greek world, according to Barbara Cassin (2016), understands time in terms of, not a reproduction of the self-same over time, but as essentially an open and ambiguous present. That is, time here goes beyond, what Cassin (regarding Lacan) calls the "fixion of culture" (Ibid.: 38) and open for change and relations across difference as significant for culture, for the presence of *paideia*.

Sophist education then, opens for difference as such, both as a cultural context as well as how the I takes form, which can never be in an ethical relation equalised as itself, ethics is not possible as reproduction and verification of self-same. To make ethics possible the I cannot possess itself too firmly, since as Butler (2015) says: "If I possess myself too firmly or too rigidly, I cannot be in an ethical relation" (Butler, 2015: 110) because there need to be a "very specific mode of being dispossessed that makes ethical relationality possible" (Ibidem).

For the Sophist's education is the very praxis of democratic culture of change and equality across difference, of being with the other as at least two, "both human and god" (Cassin, 2016: 10) and are therefore ethical. For the Sophist, the ethical response was not located within an application of certain eternal ethical principles outside the spatio-temporal world in which one lives but located within judgements rooted in experiences of the world as such. Again, the Sophists did not understand philosophy divorced from life and consequently understood educational thought as concerning how to live one's life well with and among others, and teaching as the procedure of embodying *areté*, that is to embody the virtue of living well with and among others.

A Democratic principle in education, then, as influenced by the Sophists, do not only emphasise equality, but equality across difference, a difference that extends to the idea of a person as well, and concerns how to live well with the other, as other in and through *paideia*, the ethical and political space created. The logic of at least two opens for another understanding of time in education than as reproduction of self-same, it establishes a foundational ambiguity at the heart of educational thought and is populating the world with more people than an image of a male aristocrat living an authentic life. The latter, if we follow Rancière (1999) as well as Butler (2019), is born out of a logic that within itself destroys, what with Arendt (1959) can be called the irreducible plurality of humankind.

Such logic, Rancière describes as the logic of *Ochlos*, as the creator of totality, in which the suppression of the other is finite and total, *Ochlos* becomes "the hate-driven rallying around the passion of the excluding One" (Rancière, 2007: 31). For Butler (2019) such logic is what makes Hobbes picture the world as essentially coming into being through a grown man, without a mother, as if never being a child, but fully grown man ready to be contractually and rationally attached to the society in which he lives. Such society and the world make *Ochlos* into a masculine world of One according to Butler (2019). The Aristocratic principle then can also be understood as a principle of patriarchy. It is patriarchy dependent on time as the reproduction of an eternal power position, and as such ends time, ends the possibility of ambiguity and change, the Aristocratic principle strives to end history as such (Rorty, 1980).

To teach in time, which demands ambiguity and change, it is essential to refute the Aristocratic principle as a defining characteristic of education. That is a reproduction of power is not what makes educational thought significant but rather what hinders such thought. Another way of expressing this state of affairs is to say that what we need to do is to put time back into education but then understood at the backdrop of change, and equality across difference, and as beyond the reproduction of the patriarchy of One. Barbara Cassin's readings of the classical Greeks, in which she pointed out that the other in the pagan understanding of a person is both human and god, gives reason for interaction and relations in the Spatio-temporal world, not as the application of values but as the realisation of lived values within the very practice of the relation, and here in the relation of teaching. If we understand students as both humans and gods, we can with the poets, as both Cassin (2016) and Rorty (1980) does in another context, understand students and teachers alike as the creators of the newness of the world, a world in which one lives already.

Teaching then is directed towards the emerging newness of everyone in their godly human appearance on the scene they share with others, rather than understanding teaching as the reproduction of set identities in likewise set structural conditions of Aristocratic power.

5. Time to teach and the possibility of ambiguity

Franco Bifo Berardi (2017: 55) says that "the ethical catastrophe of our times" is the inability to understand others sensibilities as extensions of our own. It is precisely here a Sophist tradition of education as I have explored above make so much sense, because if we live in a world of others with whom we interact across difference, then the very role of education is to expand the understanding of our sensibilities as extensions of others. In other words, the role of education is to expand the publicness of the public, not to restrict and to divide into mere life on the one hand and liveable life on the other, not to separate the people from the population, not to select between those who matter and those without voice or presence.

Education in the Sophist tradition of thought today as when introduced is for anyone and aims at expanding the publicness of the public, expand what Butler calls popular sovereignty, and as such education being a necessary condition for democracy to exist as democratic. Teaching the other as both human and god, introduce an essential ambiguity into the very heart of an educational relation. That is the figure of Ambi-, allows for at least two, for difference, for a history of time. Ambi- signals not one or the other, but both simultaneously, and therefore plant essential undecidability at the heart of the relation between people, which force us to reflect and think in the present, open up such presence for the mystery of the other, the radical unknowability of the other, rather than pinning someone to his or her place in the hierarchies of inequality.

Time to teach, then, can be understood as an *instantiation* of change in the present order of things. It is an intervention into powers of reproduction of the self-same, and lets us negotiate how to go on, with others who have the right, as Bauman (2000: 202) says, "to go on –differently".

6. Conclusion

In this article, I have identified two archaic modes of teaching, which I have called Socratic teaching versus Sophist teaching. I have developed them out of the absolute different logic underpinning those modes of teaching, rather than as historical artefacts. That means that the complaints about the Sophists, that they charged money to teach (Plato), or the critique that they taught anyone (Plato again) who had money, is a somewhat deserved critique when we consider the Sophists as historical artefacts. Greek society at the time, in general, had slaves, excluded women, and paedophilia with particularly young boys was an accepted practice among the elite, just to mention some of the complicated factors enter into a historical analysis of Greek society (Bloch, 2001). What I choose to emphasise in this article, not being a historian, is that what the Sophists opened up for despite their severe shortcomings in other matters was the possibility to even think democracy (Jaeger, 1939). It

is in other words, because Euripides (480-406 BC) is a democrat for which equality is the founding concept and a Sophist in his teaching, that his public pedagogy gives voice to both men of lower standing as well as women. Euripides play "Helen" (first performance 412 BC) is a particularly good example of the latter, in which Helen not only save her own life through her virtue and intelligence but also the life of her husband (Euripides, 2008). Even so, my concern has been to explore the very different logics underpinning Socratic teaching and Sophists teaching, as ahistorical when it comes to certain modes of organising social relations, and as historical in the way particularly the Sophist understanding of education make time possible like something else than the reproduction of self-same. What also has become clear, I hope, is that how teaching, in general, can be understood as not reducible to one or another technique of teaching, but that different modes of teaching are embedded in the very way we understand and organise the real as such, which also implies that there is nothing else in the world which does not also belong to the world. For the Sophist there is no separate space (of ideas), which could be called the meaning of the world, that is not already within the (educational) practices that comprise what we do in the world. That something so intimately educational, such as explaining something for someone, can be understood as the very way in which reproduction of inequality within the social sphere takes place. Identifying those archaic modes of teaching, and contrasting them, also makes clear that when we shift from one to the other, so much more than education is at stake. What is at stake is the possibility of a liveable life for all rather than only for some. Education and teaching is the very praxis of democracy, and that which makes democracy democratic; time for teaching is that which expands the publicness of the public.

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