CARTOGRAFIE SOCIALI
Rivista di sociologia e scienze umane
Anno IV, n. 8, novembre 2019

Direzione scientifica
Lucio d'Alessandro e Antonello Petrillo

Direttore responsabile
Arturo Lando

Redazione
Elena Cennini, Anna D'Ascenzio, Marco De Biase, Giuseppina Della Sala, Eugenio Galioto, Emilio Gardini, Fabrizio Greco, Luca Manunza

Comitato di redazione
Marco Armiero (KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm), Tugba Basaran (Kent University), Nick Dines (Middlesex University of London), Stefania Ferraro (Università degli Studi Suor Orsola Benincasa, Napoli), Marcello Maneri (Università di Milano Bicocca), Önder Özhan (Università di Ankara), Domenico Perrotta (Università di Bergamo), Federico Rahola (Università di Genova), Pietro Saitta (Università di Messina), Anna Simone (Università Roma Tre), Ciro Tarantino (Università della Calabria)

Comitato scientifico
Fabienne Brion (Université Catholique de Louvain -la-Neuve), Alessandro Dal Lago (Università di Genova), Davide De Sanctis (Università degli Studi Federico II - Napoli), Didier Fassin (Institute for Advanced Study School of Social Science, Princeton), Fernando Gil Villa (Universidad de Salamanca), Akhil Gupta (University of California), Michalis Lianos (Université de Rouen), Marco Martiniello (University of Liège), Laurent Mucchielli (CNRS - Centre national de la recherche scientifique), Salvatore Palidda (Università di Genova), Michel Peraldi (CADIS - Centre d'analyse et d'intervention sociologiques), Andrea Rea (Université libre de Bruxelles)

"Cartografie sociali" is a peer reviewed journal

TRA POTERE E SAPERE: STUDI CRITICI SULLA VALUTAZIONE

A cura di Davide Borrelli e Diego Giannone

MIMESIS

SUOR ORSOLA UNIVERSITY PRESS

Pubblicazione semestrale: abbonamento annuale (due numeri): € 45,00

Per gli ordini e gli abbonamenti rivolgersi a:
ordini@mimesisedizioni.it
L'acquisto avviene per bonifico intestato a:
MIM Edizioni Srl, Via Monfalcone 17/19
20099 - Sesto San Giovanni (MI)
Unicredit Banca - Milano
IBAN: IT 59 B 02008 01634 000101289368
BIC/SWIFT: UNCRITM1234

Cartografie sociali è una rivista promossa da URiT, Unità di Ricerca sulle Topografie sociali.

Direzione e Redazione della rivista hanno sede
presso l'Università degli Studi Suor Orsola Benincasa
Via Suor Orsola 10 - 80132 Napoli (Italy)
www.unisob.na.it
cartografiesociali@unisob.na.it
cartografiesociali.rivista@gmail.com

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI
SUOR ORSOLA
BENINCASA
FACOLTÀ DI
SCIENZE
DELLA FORMAZIONE



MIMESIS EDIZIONI (Milano – Udine)
www.mimesisedizioni.it
mimesis@mimesisedizioni.it

Isbn: 9788857565187
Issn: 2499-7641

© 2019 – MIM EDIZIONI SRL
Via Monfalcone, 17/19 – 20099
Sesto San Giovanni (MI)
Phone: +39 02 24861657 / 24416383
Fax: +39 02 89403935

Registrazione Tribunale di Napoli n. 37 del 5 luglio 2012

INDICE

EDITORIALE: La *neo*valutazione al governo della società
di Davide Borrelli e Diego Giannone *7*

La valutazione: un potere spacciato per sapere
di Yves Charles Zarka 37

Oggetti smarriti e ritrovati. Cartografare i valori politico-morali per comprendere l'ondata della valutazione
di Peter Dahler-Larsen 49

Dal rischio alla prestazione. Dispositivi, misurazioni, produzione del valore e inclusione differenziale
di Anna Simone 71

Il giudizio di Talos. Valutazione, algoritmi, macchine
di Mauro Santaniello 85

Vittime o complici? Sullo strano desiderio di essere valutati
di Bénédicte Vidaillet 103

Measuring and Delimiting Corruption
di Debora Valentina Malito 115

Rating agencies, symbolic capital and the evaluation of nation-states. A preliminary exploration
di Adriano Cozzolino 139

La Repubblica dei *performanti*
ovvero
si hic est asinus non erit illic equus
di Antimo Cesaro 159

The re-emerging debate over the rise of the Evaluative State in the British university sector
di Laura Giovinazzi 185

Recensione a *La mafia dimenticata*
di Salvatore Palidda 199

Debora Valentina Malito

MEASURING AND DELIMITING CORRUPTION

Abstract

Measuring political orders has become a new frontier in the emerging mode of governance. Over the recent decades, ambitious anti-corruption strategies have been accompanied by a proliferation of performance indicators that have grown substantially in number and typologies. The study of metrics and their use in global governance has also reached greater attention. Yet, the relationship between politics and information remains controversial, and scholars do not agree on the capacity, role and performativity of indicators in serving or contesting power structures standing behind governance exercises. By focusing on two of the most widely used indicators of corruption– the World Bank's Control of Corruption indicator (CC) and Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI)– this article defines to what extent these measures have contributed to delimit our understanding of corruption, by overemphasising the role of single individuals (public agents) and the absence of market competition, and by de facto discouraging a more contextualised understanding of the transnational political economy of corruption. By questioning some of the values and conventions vested in corruption indicators, this article scrutinises methodological individualism choices that have been pivotal in normalising and institutionalising the framing of corruption as a delimited (preferably national) abomination.

Keywords:

Authority, Competitiveness, Methodological individualism, Reflexivity

1. *Introduction*

The production and use of corruption indicators in the last decades have become increasingly more sophisticated, and object of growing policy interest. At the same time, the use of indicators in global governance has conquered special attention within the academic debate. The relationship between politics and information remains controversial, and scholars do not agree on the capacity, role and performativity of indicators in serving or contesting power structures standing behind governance exercises. On the one side, many practitioners and institutions have sponsored a more 'technicist view', emphasising the metrological capacity of contemporary instruments to capture complex and multiformed reality. On the other side, scholars have moved towards a postmetrological stance (Bhuta *et al.* 2018), by questioning the politics (Broome & Quirk 2015) and power of indicators (Fioramonti 2014), their instrumentality in governing (Davis *et al.* 2012; Merry *et al.* 2015), as well the logic of ranking (Cooley & Snyder 2015; Espeland & Sauder 2007) and benchmarking (Broome & Quirk 2015) as new modes of transnational governance. Moving beyond pure metrological and positivist representations of quantification as an objective, universal and decontextualised exercise, framing the contemporary indicator culture (Bhuta *et al.* 2018) has become even more compelling within the debate surrounding the use and consumptions of performance indicators. Drawing on this scholarship, this article adds another critique to the study of indicators, by questioning the role some of the most representative measures of corruption hold in (de)limiting (Gutterman & Lohaus 2018) our understanding of corruption.

This article departs from the idea that quantification does not set in motion the «transcendence of politics» (Bhuta *et al.* 2018, p. 5), but rather its «displacement» in specialised, technocratic, knowledge, as measurement remains fundamentally anchored to specific conventions, ideas and preferences. Performance indicators are part of a global system of knowledge production (Merry *et al.* 2015), where quantification is instrumental in developing innovative forms of regulatory governance, or «second order rulemaking» attempting a sort of reconciliation «among various existing fragmented implicit and explicit rules» (Mehrpouya & Samiolo 2019, p. 220). The regulatory function embedded in quantification holds both an ideological and material dimension: decision makers and practitioners use quantifications to interpret and judge the existing reality; yet, indicators are also employed to manage, organise and reform existing phenomena and realities. Power relations and preferences are displayed not only in the

use of indicators, but at the bottom of the production process. Indicators embody procedural understanding of given phenomena, and also the principles, preferences and norms shared by the organisations creating them. In the neoliberal era, indicators have been instrumental in advancing a neoliberal rationality and understanding of the reality based on principles of «market civilisation» (Gill 1995) and competitiveness. By acting as «transnational carriers» (Giannone 2017, p. 478) of neoliberal governance, the most representative measures of corruption are imbedded in methodological individualism assumptions that promote a decontextualised and (de) limited (Gutterman & Lohaus 2018, p. 247) understanding of corruption: by centring around the role of single individuals and market competition they discourages a more systemic understanding of the political economy of corruption, and its transnational character (Cooley 2017). To advance this argument, this article navigates the conventions underlying corruption indicators and proceeds as follows: first, I introduce the concept and categories of scientific authority and hegemonic consensus indispensable to frame the production of corruption indicators from a reflexivist methodology. Second, I review the major existing measures of corruption, by focusing on different categories of indices and indicators, highlighting the main ontological and methodological criticisms, constraints and pitfalls, connected with them. Third, I present a comparative analysis of two of the most widely used indicators of corruption: the World Bank's Control of Corruption indicator (CC) and Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI).

2. *Scientific authority and hegemonic consensus*

In response to positivist objectification trends, scholars have used the concepts of reflexivity and reactivity (Espeland & Sauder 2007, p. 35) to reveal mechanisms of self-confrontation defining the formation of specific social developments (Beck *et al.* 1994). The concept of reflexivity has been employed to deconstruct the process of objectification that permeates the formulation of performance indicators and the annexed instances of performativity. Indicators are not theory- and value-free entities, as a growing post-metrological realism inform most of contemporary debates on the use of consumption of indicators (Malito *et al.* 2018). Metrics influence the behavior of subjects under measurement (Espeland & Sauder 2007), but are themselves subject to influences, by acting as «pattern-setters imposing specific understandings of the topics concerned» (Giannone 2017, p. 474).

Reflexivity encourages indeed an historicist analyses of knowledge production, and this article will focus on a series of methodological individualism assumptions informing the production of twos of the most important measures of corruption. The concepts of scientific authority and hegemonic consensus are of particular relevance to frame the study of corruption indicators from a reflexivist perspective.

Indicators display a quiet (Merry *et al*. 2015) and soft form of power, defined by Kelley and Simmons (2015) as a form of social pressure where information is used to shape actors' preferences. The indicators' s soft power is based on a form of scientific authority and hegemonic consensus emanating from them. Scientific authority concerns the capacity of building or consolidating categories of interpretation; it confers to indicators the function of setting standards (Davis *et al.* 2012) and levels of performance, and it mainly results from the credibility, technical accuracy and legitimacy of those producing metrics (Cassese & Casini 2012, p. 467). Credibility depends on the recognition that both public discourse and scientific community attribute to indicators (Davis *et al.* 2012). The producer's legitimacy is dependent on a series of factors: the mandate conferred on the organisation producing the metric; the prestigious connected with a formal or informal mandate; or the normative consensus supporting the relevance of the measurement itself. While public accountability in media representation serves to bolster the visibility of the indicator, is the scientific authority (and its recognitions by other scientists) that guarantees the reproduction of the metric itself. Testing the validity of an instrument presupposes that a specific scientific community is accredited and specialised in creating and evaluating the measures' validity. When international organisations, public or private institutions produce indicators, they create new definitions and operationalisations based upon the interaction of specific values, institutional and economic arrangements. The activity of designing measures departs from precise ideological and theoretical presupposes: objects of measurement are defined according to criteria or demands, values and normative standpoints, proper of a given institutional, material or social context. At the receiving end of the indicators' s life, producers use the properties of scientific measurement as a way of justifying the objectivity and universality of their product, while users tend to "forget" that indicators do not result from parthenogenesis.

Second, scientific authority confers to indicators the possibility of holding dominant positions within the production of knowledge as producers are able to attribute a character of plurality and consensus to the new creature. A form of «common good» (Cutler 2013, p. 719) dialec-

tically operates as the common sense of contemporary global capitalism. For Murphy (2000), a transnational class of social forces sustains a scheme of global regulations where private sector markets and non-governmental organisations exercise new forms of legitimate power. For Soderbaum the creation of common values is not a simple procedural and technical exercise, but rather a «political attempt to construct an imagined community between states» (2004, p. 142). For Robert Cox, is "hegemony" the concept that better defines the exercise of power in the global neoliberal context. A transnational form of consensus regulates governance practices, where «the more powerful must act in such a way that their interests have the appearance of a general interest» (Cox 1980, p. 376). Since the governance function is performed by a «nébuleuse, a loose elite network of influential and agencies, sharing a common set of ideas» (Cox 1997, p. 61), this nébuleuse contributes to the formation of «a common economic ideology and inject this consensual outcome into national processes of decision-making» (Cox 1997, pp. 59–61). This consensual character is relevant for the study of indicators as metrics hold a relational form of authority (Lake 2009) where both the "measurer" and the "measured" more or less agree on the necessity of producing scientifically reliable and usable political information.

3. *Corruption measures*

While the production of corruption indicators has been subject to numerous normative and methodological changes, the historical evolution of this production remains less critically contextualised. The anti-corruption regime emerged around the 1990s, when a variety of international actors and organisations pushed for the creation of anti-corruption norms, legislations and rules. Although the UN General Assembly already in the mid1970s had expressed the necessity to develop anti-corruption legislations in the field of transnational commercial transactions, until the 1990s, legislative measures and anti-corruption policies remained fragmented. With the end of the Cold War, Western countries, international institutions and development agencies elaborated a new governance agenda in relation to the necessity of incorporating socialist economies into capitalist ones. Corruption scandals in Western Europe mobilised a wider attention to the phenomenon, while international institutions started paying more attention to the establishment of transparent regulatory environment[s] (International Monetary Fund 1997).

Considered as a fundamental obstacle to development, anti-corruption norms started playing also a vital function within the development debate. World Bank's economists pointed out the negative results corruption has on foreign direct investments (Gray & Kaufmann 1998). Because of transaction costs and inefficient allocation of resources spurred by acts of bribery, the normative fight against corruption became closely associated with the necessity of creating better market conditions, able to attract investors, in a more globalised economy. Anti-corruption strategies necessitated more systematic ways of monitoring states' compliance or deviance with anti-corruption rules. They also necessitated more immediate ways of identifying areas of reform. Indicators played a special role in this respect.

In the mid'1900s, Transparency International (TI) and the World Bank (WB) provided some of the first measures of corruption. In 1997, the OECD launched a legislative instrument to criminalise transnational bribery, the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions. Within the European Anti-Corruption Policy developed by the Council of Europe, the production of indicators was considered essential for the elaboration of further anti-corruption policies: in 1995, the European Ministers of Justice proposed the formation of a multidisciplinary group on corruption that, in 1995, planned to undertake both a study and a convention for fighting corruption. In 1999 the Committee of Ministers authorised the establishment of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), an European monitoring mechanism oriented to evaluate the level of corruption in each member state. Since then, measures of corruption have proliferated. There are different ways of categorising them. The classical distinction is between objective and subjective measures. In this article, I follow indeed a different categorisation, distinguishing three types of measures, as summarised in Fig.1 (Malito 2014, p. 3): survey-based measures of corruption (I), indicators of corruption provided by indices of (global) governance (II), and indicators of corruption provided by indices of state capacity (III).

Table 1. Measures of corruption (Malito 2014, p. 3)

	Provider	Measures
Corruption survey-based	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) & World Bank	Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS);
	Gallup International	Voice of the People Survey (VOPS);
	Global Business Media Limited	Business International Index; Corruption Experience Index
	International Budget Partnership	Open Budget Survey
	Transparency International	Corruption Perceptions Index
	Transparency International & Gallup International	Bribery perception index (BPI); Global Corruption Barometer (GCB)
(Global) Governance Indices (II)	European Commission	Eurobarometer
	EU ICS Research Consortium	International Crime Victimization Surveys (ICVS)
	European Values Study	European Values Study
	Freedom House	Nation in Transit (NIT)
	Global Integrity & Mo ‘Ibrahim foundation	Africa Integrity Indicators; Index of African Governance; The Corruption Notebooks; Global Integrity Index
	HIS Global Insight	Global Insight
	Institute for Management Development (IMD)	The Global Competitiveness Report (GRC)
	Latinobarometro Corporation	Latinobarometer
	Michigan State University	Afrobarometer
	The Political Risk Service Group	The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)

	UNECA	Africa Governance Indicator (AGI)
	World Bank	World Governance Indicators (WGI); WB Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
	World Economic Forum	Executive Opinion Survey; World Competitiveness Yearbook; Global Competitiveness Report (GRC)
	WVS Association	World Value Survey (WVS)
State Capacity Indices (III)	Brooking institute	Index of State Weakness in the Developing World
	Brooking institute, the Institute for State Effectiveness, the Institute for State Effectiveness, and the Australian National University	Sovereignty Index
	Canadian International Development Agency	Country Indicators for foreign policy project
	Centre for Global Policy, George Mason University	Political Instability Task Force
	Center for Systemic Peace and Center for Global Policy at George Mason University	State Fragility Index
	Columbia University	State Capacity Survey
	Fund for Peace, Foreign Policy	Failed States Index
	World Bank	Low income countries under stress, LICUS

The first group, composed of survey-based measures of corruption (I), emerged in the mid-1990s when the first demands for effective anti-corruption policies encouraged the formulation of *ad hoc*, specific, measures of corruption, budget transparency and accountability indices or commercial surveys. This first group includes: the *Corruption Perceptions Index* (CPI), the *Bribery Perception Index* (BPI) and *Bribe Payers Index*,

published by TI; the *Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey* (BEEPS) performed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank (Kaufmann *et al.* 2006); the *Corruption Experience Index* and the *Business International Index*, issued by Business International; the *Open Budget Survey* issued by the International Budget Partnership and *Voices of the People Survey* developed by Gallup International.

In the mid-1990s a group (II) of composite measures of governance emerged, in which corruption constitutes one of the key dimensions for estimating broader levels of governance. This group includes: the World Bank *Worldwide Governance Indicators* (WGI); the *International Country Risk Guide* (ICRG); the *Global Competitiveness Report* (GRC); the *Executive Opinion Survey*; the *World Competitiveness Yearbook;* the *Nations in Transit* (NIT), the *World Value Survey* (WVS); the *International Crime Victimization Surveys* (ICVS); the *Global Integrity*; *Global Insight* and the WB *Country Policy and Institutional Assessment* (CPIA). This second group includes also regional measures of corruption such as the *Eurobarometer*, the *European Values Study,* the *Asiabarometer*, the *Latinobarometer,* the *Africa Governance Indicator* (AGI), the *African Integrity Indicator*, the *Afrobarometer* and the *Index of African Governance*.

A third group of corruption measures has been provided by state-capacity indices (III) oriented to estimate the countries' performance in a set of spheres considered to be critical for safeguarding the integrity of government responsibilities. These indicators have proliferated in the 2000s, when state-capacity discourses gathered major attention. Indicators of corruption within state-capacity indexes include, at least: the *State Capacity Survey* developed by Columbia University; the *State Fragility Index* published by the Center for Systemic Peace and Center for Global Policy at George Mason University; the *Sovereignty Index* elaborated by the joint-venture between the Brookings Institution, the Institute for State Effectiveness, the Institute for State Effectiveness, and the Australian National University (Ghani *et al.* 2005); the *Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Project* delivered by the Canadian International Development Agency (Carment *et al.* 2006; The World Bank 1997); the *Political Instability Task Force* launched by the Centre for Global Policy at George Mason University (Goldstone *et al.* 2010), the *Index of State Weakness in the Developing World* published by the Brooking institute (Rice & Patrick, 2008); the *Failed States Index* produced by the Fund for Peace and published by Foreign Policy (Haken *et al.* 2012) and the list of Low Income Countries Under Stress*, LICUS* countries (The World Bank 2007) generated by the World Bank.

Although the anti-corruption norm has been institutionalised in different ways from different actors, the term "corruption" is usually used to refers to an improper use of power by public officials or public servants in order to obtain personal benefits. Across different definitions emerged during the last decades (Andvig *et al.* 2000; Galtung 2006), a sort of consensus emerges in the unit of analysis: corruption refers to the individual behaviour of public agents. The UN defines corruption as «the abuse of power for private gain» (UN 2004); the WB defines corruption as «the abuse of public office for private gain» (Worldwide Governance Indicators, WGI 2019); TI refers to the «the abuse of entrusted power» (Transparency International 2019), «the measure of public power for private benefit […] related to receiving money or valuable assets, but it may also encompass increases in power or status» (Lambsdorff 2007). An ambiguity emerges vis-à-vis from the relationship between corruption and bribery: while the OECD adopts a definition that embraces both active or passive bribery (OECD 2008), TI conceptualises active bribery, as a separate form of corruption.

These definitional incongruencies are partly informed by the multidimensional nature of the phenomenon (Rohwer 2009, p. 43). At the same time, the concept of corruption evokes two common normative starting-points: good governance and public interest. For the CPI' s creator, Lambsdorff, corruption represents the measure of public power for private benefit (Lambsdorff 2007, p. 17). Wondering whether corruption should be related to formal obligations or public expectations, Lambsdorff anchored corruption to a predefinied concept of public interest. Other scholars have interpreted corruption as a deviation from the "legal-rational model" of stateness (Andvig *et al.* 2000) and attribute of bad governance. During the 1990s, many researchers have tended to interpret corruption as a phenomenon originating in deviant forms of political authority (clientelism, patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism). The concept of state embedded within the measures of corruption is based on Weber's ideal type of rational-legal-bureaucracy (*ibidem*), implying a coherent and uniform image of the state, following a linear pattern of political (and economic) development. By attributing to these ideal-types a standardised value, each variation from the central value can be interpreted as evidence of defective governance, and indicators are then transformed into judges, rather than monitors, of political orders. While represented as universal, the notions of state and public interest embedded in these definitions are indeed particularistic notions, informed by specific experiences and understanding of the way of governing. Measures of corruption in fact emphasises a national and individualistic understanding of corruption, while glassing over more systematic

understanding of transnational economic order producing corruption. As pointed out by Gutterman and Lohaus (2018, p. 247), the anti-corruption norm emphasises a (de)limited understanding of corruption, that centring around the role of single individuals, discourages a systemic understanding of the international political economy of corruption. Methodological nationalism represents for Cooley the mechanism of distraction concealing the role of transnational forces and actors in easing corruption (Cooley 2017). A series of methodological choices have been pivotal in normalising and institutionalising the framing of corruption as a delimited (preferably national) abomination.

On the one side, the first generation of corruption indicators has largely been informed by subjective data. Scholars have also raised a set of important methodological observations concerning the production of these indicators (Treisman 2007; You & Khagram 2005; sAsXmlApaza 2009; Lambsdorff 2007). First, the use of opinions and perceptions privilege relative views, «inferences» (Treisman 2007, p. 13), based on subjective judgments provided by specific groups of business elite or experts (Andvig *et al.* 2000), which might tend to omits the «absolute» amount of corruption (Galtung 1998). While some scholars have raised criticisms according to which experts' judgment may be fundamentally imprecise and biased (You & Khagram 2005), others have addressed ontological criticisms, supporting the notion that the quantification of subjective judgments inappropriately transform personal judgments into impersonal measures. On the other side, country representation in many surveys is asymmetrical, because of missing data. The comparative temptation of measuring cross-national values and variations of corruption is indeed challenged by a series of methodological shortcoming, such as data availability and country coverage. A problem of transparency in data collection arises as missing data create the necessity of devising alternative ways of data collection. This might induce researchers to derive information from secondary sources without considering whether the information can be adequately aggregated with others (Arndt & Oman 2006; Rohwer 2009). Many composite measures are affected indeed by scarce conceptual clarity (Van Dijk & Van Mierlo 2011), as they might be dependent on obscure methodologies or sources that are not publicly available (Knack & Keefer 1995). Another problem is the «conceptual precision» (Knack 2006) of composite indicators, as non-transparent methodologies risk to jeopardise the internal validity of measures whereas the independence between sources cannot be guaranteed.

4. *Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Control of Corruption (CC/WGI)*

In this section I navigates the principles and conventions informing the methodologies adopted in the construction of two of the most widely used indicators of corruption: the World Bank's Control of Corruption indicator (CC) and the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The WB's demand for corruption indicators emerged with the necessity of supporting development policy and governance assistance measures, through the creation of more sophisticated instruments able of reducing public spending and discretion, encouraging economic liberalisation and accountability (The World Bank 2000). Reducing corruption was conceptualised as a necessary measure to control the effectiveness of development aid (The World Bank 2002), as in many cases aid had increased corruption in the receiving country. At the same time, the Bank had considered liberalisation and privations as anti-corruption instruments able to «remove parastatals from political control as vehicles for patronage or rent distribution» (The World Bank 2002, p. 22). TI's demand for fighting corruption, indeed, was oriented to developing participative good governance as part of «social pressures» shaping citizens' behaviour (Transparency International 2019a). Even though TI works in close collaboration with government and international organisations such as the WB and IMF, the organisations adhere to cosmopolitan values prioritising the role of civil society in participatory governance. To these demands correspond different priorities. While the CPI prioritises the measurement of corruption as an empowering instrument serving a cosmopolitan civil society (Transparency International 2019a), CC is one of the six indicators necessary to assess a measure of governance. TI's aim with the CPI was to raise public awareness about corruption in order to improve government's regulations and public accountability (Transparency International 2018a). The WB pursued with the WGI the aim of creating better instruments of government assistance (The World Bank 2007). Both these normative ideals hold a crucial function in informing the production of these measures, and I will now define the methodological individualism assumptions supporting them.

4.1 *Individual agency and the use of subjective data*

Both CPI and CC privilege a definition of corruption as anchored to the individual behaviour of a public agent. While the CPI defines corruption

as the «abuse of entrusted power for private gain» (Transparency International 2018b), for the WB corruption captures «the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests» (Kaufmann *et al.* 2000). CPI exclusively focuses on the role of public officials, while CC recognises also the role of private interests in corrupting the state; the role of the business elite in corroding the space of integrity remains however on the shadow. Corruption remains fundamentally about the erosion of public integrity, while the long chain of command leading to such an erosion remains unaddressed.

Corruption is also understood as a national problem: there is no way of tracking the transnational dimension of corruption. Both CC and CPI relies on subjective data, opinions and perceptions that rarely consider more systemic aspects. The CPI 2018 data includes perceptions of both resident and non-resident panels of experts drawn from 13 different data sources provided by NGOs[1] and business executives,[2] with respect to the performance of foreign and home countries[3]. CC data includes, indeed, 31 sources provided by surveys of firms and households[4], by commercial business information[5], non-governmental[6] and public sector organisa-

1 Bertelsmann Foundation Sustainable Governance Indicators; Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index; Freedom House Nations in Transit; Global Insight Country Risk Ratings; Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey.

2 African Development Bank Governance Ratings; IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook; Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Asian Intelligence; Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide; World Bank - Country Performance and Institutional Assessment; Economist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Ratings.

3 African Development Bank Governance Ratings; IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook; Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Asian Intelligence; Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide; World Bank - Country Performance and Institutional Assessment; Economist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Ratings.

4 Afro-barometer; Business Enterprise Environment Survey; Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer; World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report; Gallup World Poll; Latino-barometro; Political Economic Risk Consultancy Corruption in Asia; Vanderbilt University Americas Barometer; Institute for Management and Development World Competitiveness Yearbook.

5 Economist Intelligence Unit Risk-wire & Democracy Index, iJET Country Security Risk Ratings, Political Risk Services, Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators.

6 Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads, Freedom House, Global Integrity Index, Heritage Foundation Index of Economic

tions[7]. As widely noted by the literature that is critical about the use of subjective indicators, perception measures opinions and not facts about corruption's gravity or incidence (Treisman 2007). Both CPI and CC overemphasise what the business elite think about corruption in a given country: in many of the survey informing the disaggregated sources, the questions presuppose that foreign companies are «victims of corruption» (De Maria 2008) and that corruption disappears with increased levels of market competition. Respondents provide their understanding about the business environment in a given country departing from precise ideological assumptions. According to Sequeira (2012), one of the most important cognitive biases affecting subjective measures of corruption is the bandwagon effect, which relates to the fact that perceptions of respondents tend to climb aboard the bandwagon of the common perceptions of corruption in a given country. According to Andvig «this makes it almost impossible to determine whether the perception of increasing corruption levels worldwide is based on facts or not» (Andvig *et al.* 2000). For the WB for instance, correlation between sources is considered a proxy for accuracy (Knack 2006), while actually, correlation between sources may be caused by the interdependence of judgments. Since the WB attributes higher weight to major correlated sources, the high correlation existing between governance perceptions rankings risks to perpetuate perception errors. As claimed by Arndt and Oman (2006) data provided by many of the sources employed both by TI and WB cannot be considered fully independent from each other. The Bandwagon effect plays also an important role when corruption indicators are used in composite measures of governance or state fragility. CC for instance, is one of the most widely used indicators of corruption within almost all the indices of state weakness. Moreover, the weighting system adopted by the WB in aggregating sources assumes that each source holds an "unobservable" value. The WB adopts an Unobserved Component Model (UCM) (Kaufmann *et al.* 2007) in which corruption is approximated as a linear function of

Freedom, African Electoral Index, International Research and Exchanges Board Media Sustainability Index, International Budget Project Open Budget Index, Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index.

7 African Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments, Asian Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Transition Report; Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database and Political Terror Scale; IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessments; Institutional Profiles Database; World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments; US State Department Trafficking in People report.

unobserved corruption g, in a country j, and a disturbance term ε; i.e. $y_{jk} = a_k + \beta_k (g_j + \varepsilon_{jk})$. The parameters a and β are essential to rescale the data into common units, but at the same they are based on «unrealistic assumptions» (Arndt and Oman, 2006: 104). The most important implications of the average weighting method undertaken by the WB is to de facto build a hegemonic position in the production of indicators, and knowledge, where the correlation among the majority of sources tend to privilege those measures that better correlate with each other.

4.2 *Halo effect and competitiveness*

Another cognitive bias affecting subjective indicators of corruption is the «halo effect», i.e. the tendency to associate corruption with lower standards of development (Sequeira 2012). Several scholars have observed that perceptions about corruption in less developed countries may be influenced by development trends. Although different understanding and experiences of corruption exists, CC and CPI tend to subsume the diversity and multidimensionality of this phenomenon by relying on the normative values and methodological assumptions of those actors valuing the institutional quality anchored to the neoliberal mode of governance. According to Glaeser, a correlation between governance ratings and levels of development exists, since there is an ontological interdependence between the perception of corruption and the ratings produced by business people or commercial risk rating agencies (Glaeser *et al.* 2004): corruption must be higher in less developed countries, and lower in richest countries because the opinion of business people or academic experts may be influenced by the fact that low-developed, conflict prone societies are perceived as more corrupt. As pointed out by Treisman (2007, p. 1), «countries that depend on fuel exports or have intrusive business regulations and unpredictable inflation are judged more corrupt». However, even if higher development causes lower perceptions of corruption, controlling for income, «most factors that predict perceived corruption do not correlate with recently available measures of actual corruption experiences» (*ibidem*). This bias particularly affects the CC, since the WGI attribute major value to those commercial risk ratings evidencing greater correlations between them. While Kurtz and Shrank have argued that the halo effect may justify the high correlation existing between the Government Effectiveness indicator (one of the six indicators within the WGI) and growth rate (Kurtz & Schrank 2008), Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006, 2007) have rejected these criticisms by arguing that there is no robust empirical base supporting this concern.

However, other scholars have reinforced this point affirming that measures of actual corruption do not correlate with any of these development factors once one controls for income (Treisman 2007).

Neoclassical economists have widely supported the assumption that corruption opposes competition, as it incurs in costs driving firms out of the market (Romer 1994), and that pro-liberalisation policies offers incentives necessary to discourage it. As result, the WB has assumed an active role in promoting pro-privatisation stance in 'low income countries under stress' (LICUS) (The World Bank 2002). In contrast, some scholars have pointed out that perfect competition does not necessarily reduce corruption (Bliss & Tella 1997), and countries with heavier regulation suffers also higher level of corruption (Djankov *et al.* 2002). Neoclassical economists presuppose that power opposes competition, and corruption – as epitome of the abuse of power – is often understood as antagonistic with market competition. However, the existence of such an antagonistic relationship between power and competition is contestable. Marxist political economist Palermo confutes Walsarian and post-Walsarian assumptions that «competition is the reign of freedom» (Palermo 2016, p. 62), pointing out that competition coexists with power and assumes a coercive function. As neoclassical economists take the category of competition for granted, they assume that power can be explained though ahistorical categories of opportunistic behaviors and market imperfections. In contrast, a Marxists understanding emphasises the role of competition as a «social mechanism imposing the "coercive laws" of capital» (Palermo 2016, p. 84). As power cannot be explained by the absence of competition, also the abuse of power for private gains cannot be explained by absence of competition, democratic institutions or economic growth. These indicators have reiterated indeed liberal aspirations sustaining the pro-liberalisation and good governance debate, as the prevailing conceptualisation across the measures aggregate inside CPI and CC assumes that competition is antagonistic to corruption. By feeding the vision of corruption as a deviation from the formal and legal-rational model of state, metrics have become actually measures of what state integrity (as the opposite of corruption) "should be", and not of what actually is. In this respect, they represent measures of conformity with a given «hegemonic paradigm» (Giannone 2017, p. 473). For instance, indicators of corruption in developing countries do not take into consideration the divergences existing between *de jure* and *de facto* regulations. The absence or presence of regulations is not enough to quantify the intensity and recurrence of corruption in a given country. As confirmed by Hallward, in many African countries the firms' actual experiences with

the regulatory environment does not correspond to the formal regulations to which they are subject to (Hallward-Driemeier *et al.* 2010). As a result, indicators of corruption might actually measure an "idea" of corruption, in many cases transferred from donors to post-colonial countries via Structural Adjustment Programs. According to De Maria, the CPI advances an understanding of corruption in African countries that privileges a «greed-based approach», where corruption is constructed as «a trans-cultural "disease"» (De Maria 2008, p. 187) that does not help us to visualise the connection between agents of global capitalism and the reality of corruption on specific contexts. The descriptive and explanatory logic of performative metrics raises also further complications. When indicators are employed to describe standards and evaluate performances, the social complexity simplified behind numbers is not spelled out. Social complexity is indeed of fundamental importance to mitigate the idea that metrics hold an absolute comparability power. The numerical representation of social phenomena suffers a loss of information that may be accepted for limited descriptive purposes, but more grounded and in-context information are necessary to make sense of ordinal information.

4.3 *Rankings and comparability*

The ranking used to represent CPI and CC reinforce the idea of comparing countries across a unilinear interpretation of development, even though both cross-country comparison and measurement over time require methodological precautions that users tend often to ignore. Generally, indicators are based on a rank-order structure oriented to enable comparisons. However, the ordinal character per se, allows us also to make biased comparisons. Since the position of each country is determined by the position of the other countries scored in the same index, cross-county comparison is here based more on indexation rather than on an appropriate comparability of the level of corruption in each country. CC for instance, suffers a longitudinal deficit because the measures provided by the WB are not informative about trends in global averages: ranking and data sources are not comparable form year to year, since the composition of the sample substantially changes over time (Andvig *et al.* 2000). Cross-country comparisons are also affected by the disparity of sources available for each country: for instance, by looking at the level of CC published within WGI 2017, while 15 sources are employed to compute the score for Tanzania and Uganda, for countries like Andorra, Reunion, Martinique, only one source is available. Also the CPI suffered a longitudinal deficit. Until 2012, the CPI did

not allow us to make comparisons over time: data were aggregated on the basis of relative positions held by countries, with a standardised procedure computing a simple mean and standard deviation representing each previous year (Transparency International 2012). A methodological change introduced in 2012 has improved the longitudinal reliability of the index (Transparency International 2012). Until then however, this methodological aspect did not discourage many users to use the index for improper interpretations of in-country variations across years. Year to year changes in the score of corruption in one country might not necessarily reflect a change in the country's performance; in the case of the CPI, a country could achieve a better (worse) position just because new countries might have been included (excluded) in the index, or because other countries would have been able (or not) to better perform. As pointed out by Arndt and Oman (2006, p. 41) «While Transparency International clearly asserts that the CPI is a ranking and cannot be used as a measure of national performance in the fight against corruption (Galtung 2005), it is often (mis) interpreted by newspapers, and sometimes (mis)used by donors, as precisely such a measure». As result, the ranking activity has tended to create a ranking paradox: especially subjective indicators have become suitable substitutes for corruption (Cooley 2013) and «countries are perceived as less or more corrupt than they actually are» (Søreide 2006, p. 21).

One of the most controversial implications of the proliferation of rankings concerns the reproduction of new developmental categories and capacity thresholds indispensable to justify universal regulatory interventions, rather than monitoring phenomena that may or may not require alternative policies intervention. Aid agencies and international investors, in fact, have been interested in using the comparability and performativity character of metrics as a leverage for imposing political and economic conditionality or demonstrating the positive effects of the regulatory interventions undertaken.

5. *Conclusions*

Both CPI and CC hold a hegemonic position within the contemporary «indicator culture» and global system of knowledge production (Merry *et al.* 2015). The formation of such a hegemonic position has been deeply influenced by the indicator's scientific authority. CC holds a strong institutional form of legitimacy as the indicator's producer is also the leading international financial institution promoting, defending and exporting

neoliberal modes of governance. The CPI acquired a huge relevance in the mid-1990s because of the emergence of the normative anti-corruption regime, and the role played by TI in emphasising civil society participation and accountability in democratic governance. CPI and CC enjoy also a good credibility deriving from the recognition that public discourse and scientific community attributes to them. Both the CPI and WGI base their credibility on the fact of being accredited by a research community that values scientific and analytical rigor. The fact of being quoted and published in international peer-reviews journals (Davis *et al.* 2012) guarantees an iterative process of evaluation, quotation and revision that validates the reproduction of a given approach to the entire measurability's effort.

The transparency, scientific nature and representativity of these measures has however been highly contested by a growing scholarship. This article adds to this debate the observation that CPI and CC have contributed to delimit our understanding of corruption, by overemphasising the role of single individuals (public agents) and the absence of market competition, and by de facto discouraging a more contextualised understanding of the transnational political economy of corruption. The two measures are informed by ontological choices inspired by methodological individualism, where: 1) the opinions of business elite are elevated to scientific truth, 2) associations between corruption and lower standards of development have been formulated on the assumption that corruption opposes competition, and 3) ranking have been used reinforce the idea of comparing countries across a unilinear interpretation of development.

Such "(de)limiting" trend is not in contradiction with the way in which corruption has been institutionalised (Gutterman & Lohaus 2018) in the anti-corruption regime emerged in the '90s, i.e. what Bukovansky defines as «the extension of efforts to expand and solidify the preconditions for a global, liberal market economy» (2002, p. 3). Corruption indicators have been pivotal in the crystallisation of an ideal «neoliberal competition state» (Giannone 2017), where corruption remains a delimited and national abomination, explained by the lack of market competition, while foreign companies' access to national market and competitiveness stand in contraposition to the barbarities of corruption. As pointed out by Mungiu-Pippidi, many of the contemporary measures are embedded into a «principal-agent approach», where public authority and individual responsibility remains still the principal actor and focus within anti-corruption strategies. Many studies, «postulate the existence at all times of a well-meaning "principal" whose trust is abused by some "agent" and in whose interest is to fight corruption» (Mungiu-Pippidi 2013, p. 102).

By focusing on the finger pointing at the moon the anti-corruption research agenda has contributed to delimit our understanding of corruption to the realities of single, national, agents. Also anti-corruption measures have tended to address a micro understanding of corruption as rooted into individualist assumptions about deviation. As noted by Mungiu-Pippidi (2013, p. 102), «assistance for good-governance programs usually is directed toward such principals (ministries, control agencies, and anti-corruption bodies), which are assumed to be morally above corruption». Contemporary measures do not allow indeed to discover to what extent the structure surrounding the agent's behaviour is part of the problem, and far more research efforts in this direction are needed.

Debora Valentina Malito (debora.malito@xjtlu.edu.cn)
Assistant Professor, Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Department of International Relations,
Suzhou, People's Republic of China

References

Andvig J. C., Amundsen O.-H. F. I., Søreide T., & Sissener T., 2000, *Research on Corruption* (No. Final Report) (pp. 1-158), Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) & Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

Apaza C. R., 2009, *Measuring Governance and Corruption Through the Worldwide Governance Indicators: Critiques, Responses, and Ongoing Scholarly Discussion*, in «PS: Political Science & Politics», 43, pp. 139–143.

Arndt C., & Oman C., 2006, *Development Centre Studies Uses and Abuses of Governance Indicators*, Paris, OECD Publishing.

Beck U., Giddens A., & Lash S., 1994, *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press.

Bhuta N., Malito D. V., & Umbach G., 2018, *Of Numbers and Narratives - Indicators in Global Governance and the Rise of a Reflexive Indicator Culture*. In Malito D. V., G. Umbach, & N. Bhuta (Eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Indicators in Global Governance* (pp. 1-29), London, Palgrave MacMillan.

Bliss C., & Tella R. D., 1997, *Does Competition Kill Corruption?,* in «Journal of Political Economy», 105(5), pp. 1001–1023.

Broome A., & Quirk J., 2015, *The Politics of Numbers: The Normative Agendas of Global Benchmarking*, in «Review of International Studies», 41(5), pp. 813–818. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210515000339

Bukovansky, M., 2002, *Corruption Is Bad*, Department of International Relation RSPAS, Australian National University. Retrieved from http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ir/pubs/work_papers/02-5.pdf

Carment D., El-Achkar S., & Prest S., 2006, *The 2006 Country Indicators for Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Challenges for Canada*, in «Canadian Foreign Policy Journal», 13, pp. 1–35.

Cassese S., & Casini L., 2012, *Public Regulation of Global Indicators*. In Davis K. E., A. Fisher, B. Kingsbury, & S. E. Merry (Eds.), *Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Quantification and Rankings* (pp. 465–474), Oxford (UK), Oxford University Press.

Cooley A., 2017, *How International Rankings Constitute and Limit our Understanding of Global Governance Challenges: The Case of Corruption*, in Malito D. V., G. Umbach, & N. Bhuta (Eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Indicators in Global Governance* (pp. 49-67), London, Palgrave MacMillan.

Cooley A., & Snyder J., 2015, *Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of Global Governance*, New York, Cambridge University Press.

Cox R. W., 1980, *The Crisis of World Order and the Problem of International Organization in The 1980s,* in «International Journal», pp. 370–395.

Id., 1997, *Democracy in Hard Times: Economic Globalization and the Limits to Liberal Democracy*, in McGrew A. G. (Ed.), *The Transformation of Democracy: Globalization and Territorial Democracy* (Vol. 1, pp. 49–71), Cambridge (UK), Polity Press.

Cutler C., 2013, *Legal Pluralism as the "Common Sense" of Transnational Capitalism*, in «Oñati Socio-Legal Series», 3(4).

Davis K. E., Fisher A., Kingsbury B., & Merry S. E. (2012), *Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Classification and Rankings*, Oxford (UK), Oxford University Press.

De Maria B., 2008, *Neo-Colonialism through Measurement: A Critique of the Corruption Perception Index,* in «Critical Perspectives on International Business», 4(2/3), pp. 184–202.

Espeland W. N., & Sauder M., 2007, *Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds*, in «American Journal of Sociology», 113(1), pp. 1–40.

Fioramonti, D. L., 2014, *How Numbers Rule the World: The Use and Abuse of Statistics in Global Politics*, London, Zed Books Ltd.

Galtung F., 2006, *Measuring the Immeasurable: Boundaries and Functions of (Macro) Corruption Indices*, in Connors C., A. Shacklock, & G. Sampford (Eds.), *Measuring Corruption* (pp. 101–130), Farnham (UK), Ashgate Publishing Company.

Ghani A., Lockhart C., & Carnahan M., 2005, *Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-Building*, Overseas Development Institute London. Retrieved from http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/2482.pdf

Giannone D., 2017, *The Politics of Global Indicators in Designing, Promoting and Legitimating the Competition State*, in «Partecipazione e Conflitto», 10(2), pp. 472–491.

Gill S., 1995, *Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism*, in «Millennium-Journal of International Studies», 24(3), pp. 399–423.

Glaeser E. L., La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F., & Shleifer A., 2004, *Do Institutions Cause Growth?*, in «Journal of Economic Growth», 9(3), pp. 271–303.

Goldstone J. A., Bates R. H., Epstein D. L., Gurr T. R., Lustik M. B., Marshall M. G., Ulfelder J., & Woodward M., 2010, *A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability*, in «American Journal of Political Science», 54(1), pp. 190–208. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00426.x

Gray C. W., & Kaufmann D., 1998, *Corruption and Development*, in «The World Bank, Prem Notes», 4.

Gutterman E., & Lohaus M., 2018, *What Is the "Anti-corruption" Norm in Global Politics?*, in Kubbe I. & A. Engelbert (Eds.), *Corruption and Norms: Why Informal Rules Matter* (pp. 241–268), Cham (CH), Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66254-1_12

Haken N., Messner J. J., Hendry K., Taft P., Lawrence K., Anderson T., Jaeger R., Manning N., Umaña F., & Whitehead A., 2012, *Failed States Index 2012,* (J. J. Messner, Ed.), Washington (D.C.), The Fund for Peace Publication.

Kaufmann D., Hellman J., Jones G., & Schankerman M., 2000, *Measuring Governance, Corruption, and State Capture: How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in Transition Economies*, The World Bank Institute Governance Regulation and Finance and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Kaufmann D., Kraay A., & Mastruzzi M., 2006, *Measuring Governance Using Cross-Country Perceptions Data*, in Rose-Ackerman S. (Ed.), *International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption* (pp. 52-104), Cheltenham (UK), Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

Id., 2007, *The Worldwide Governance Indicators Project*, World Bank Publications.

Kelley J. G., & Simmons B. A., 2015, *Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in International Relations*, in «American Journal of Political Science», 59(1) pp. 55–70.

Knack S. F., 2006, *Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia*, World Bank Publications.

Knack S., & Keefer P., 1995, *Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures*, in «Economics & Politics», pp. 203–227.

Kurtz M. J., & Schrank A., 2008, *Growth and Governance: Models, Measures, and Mechanisms*, in «The Journal of Politics», 69(2), pp. 538–554. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00549.x

Lake D. A., 2009, *Relational Authority and Legitimacy in International Relations*, in «American Behavioral Scientist», 53(3), pp. 331–353. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764209338796

Lambsdorff J. G., 2007, *The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform*, Cambridge (UK), Cambridge University Press.

Malito D. V., 2014, *Measuring Corruption Indicators and Indices*, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper, 13. Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2393335

Malito D. V., Umbach G., & Bhuta N., 2018, *The Palgrave Handbook of Indicators in Global Governance*, London, Palgrave MacMillan.

Mehrpouya A., & Samiolo R., 2019, *Numbers in Regulatory Intermediation: Exploring the Role of Performance Measurement Between Legitimacy and Compliance*, in «Regulation & Governance», 13(2), pp. 220-239.
Merry S. E., Davis K. E., & Kingsbury B., 2015, *The Quiet Power of Indicators Measuring Development, Corruption, and the Rule of Law*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mungiu-Pippidi, A., 2013, *Tocqueville and the Struggle Against Corruption*, in «Journal of Democracy», 24, pp. 1–16.
Murphy C. N., 2000, *Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood*, in «International Affairs», 76(4), pp. 789–804.
OECD, 2008, *OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms*, Paris, OECD Publishing.
Palermo G., 2016, *Economics and Power: A Marxist Critique*, London, Routledge.
Rice S. E., & Patrick S., 2008, *Index of State Weakness in the Developing World*, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution.
Rohwer A., 2009, *Measuring Corruption: A Comparison between the Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index and the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators*, in «CESifo DICE Report», 7(3), pp. 42–52.
Romer P., 1994, *New Goods, Old Theory, and the Welfare Costs of Trade Restrictions*, in «Journal of Development Economics», 43(1), pp. 5–38.
Sequeira S., 2012, *Advances in Measuring Corruption in the Field*, in D. Serra & L. Wantchekon (Eds.), *New Advances in Experimental Research on Corruption*, Emerald Group Publishing.
Søreide T., 2006, *Business Corruption: Incidence, Mechanisms, and Consequences*, Thesis submitted for the degree of dr. oecon at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH), Bergen, Norway 9 February 2006.
Soederberg S., 2004, *The Politics of the New International Financial Architecture: Reimposing Neoliberal Domination in the Global South*, London, Zed Books.
The World Bank, 1997, *World Development Report*, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank.
Id., 2000, *Helping Countries Combat Corruption*, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank.
Id., 2002, *World Bank Group Work in Low-Income Countries Under Stress: A Task Force Report*, The World Bank.
Id., 2007, *IDA's Performance Based Allocation Systems: Options for Simplifying the Formula and Reducing Volatility*, International Development Association Resource Mobilization (FRM), retrieved from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/956181468136800628/pdf/387510idasecm200710104core.pdf
Transparency International, 2012, *Corruption Perception Index 2012: Short Methodology Note*, available at: http://www.transparency.org/files/content/pressrelease/2012_CPIUpdatedMethodology_EMBARGO_EN.pdf
Id., 2018a, *Corruption Perception Index 2018: Short Methodology Note*, available at: https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018#methodology
Id., 2018b, *Corruption Perception Index 2018*, available at: https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018#summary
Id., 2019, *Website*, available at: http://www.transparency.org/

Id., 2019a, *FAQ*, available at: http://transparencyschool.org/faq/

Treisman D., 2007, *What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?*, in «Annual Review of Political Science», 10, pp. 211–244.

Van Dijk J., & Van Mierlo F. K., 2011, *Indicators of Corruption: Further Explorations of the Link between Corruption and Implementation Failure in Anti-Trafficking Policies*, in «Working paper, International Victimology Institute (INTERVICT)», University of Tilburg, the Netherlands, pp. 1–30.

WGI, Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2019, *Frequently Asked Questions*, available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#faq

You J. S., & Khagram S., 2005, *A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption*, in «American Sociological Review», 70, pp. 136–157.

Finito di stampare
nel mese di novembre 2019
da Geca Industrie Grafiche – San Giuliano Milanese (MI))