CARTOGRAFIE SOCIALI
Rivista di sociologia e scienze umane
Anno XI, n. 21, 2026

Direzione scientifica
Lucio d'Alessandro e Antonello Petrillo

Direttore responsabile
Arturo Lando

Redazione
Elena Cennini, Anna D'Ascenzio, Fabrizio Greco

Staff di supporto alla Redazione
Giuseppina Della Sala, Federica Graziano, Luca Manunza, Andrea Postiglione

Staff di supporto alla Redazione per le attività di internazionalizzazione
Lucio Castracani, Laura Giovinazzi

Coordinamento redazionale
Stefania Ferraro (Università degli Studi Suor Orsola Benincasa – Napoli)

Comitato di redazione
Manuel Anselmi (Unitelma Sapienza), Marco Armiero (KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm),Tugba Basaran (Kent University), Davide Caselli (Università Milano-Bicocca), Valentina Castellini (Università di Toronto), Alberto De Nicola (Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna), Nick Dines (Robert Schuman Centre – European University Institute), Stefania Ferraro (Università degli Studi Suor Orsola Benincasa – Napoli), Marcello Maneri (Università di Milano Bicocca), Alessandro Mazzola (University of Liège), Michelangelo Pascali (Università degli Studi Federico II – Napoli), Domenico Perrotta (Università di Bergamo),Valeria Piro (Università degli Studi di Milano), Ciro Pizzo (Università degli Studi Suor Orsola Benincasa – Napoli), Pietro Saitta (Università di Messina), Luigi Sica (Università degli Studi Suor Orsola Benincasa – Napoli), Anna Simone (Università Roma Tre)

Comitato scientifico
Maurizio Bergamaschi (Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna), Emiliano Bevilacqua (Università del Salento), Fabienne Brion (Université Catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve), Sandro Busso (Università degli Studi di Torino), Alessandro Dal Lago (già professore presso Università di Genova), Davide De Sanctis (Università degli Studi Federico II – Napoli), Vincent Dubois (Université de Strasbourg), Didier Fassin (Institute for Advanced Study School of Social Science, Princeton), Domenico Fruncillo (Università degli Studi di Salerno), Fernando Gil Villa (Universidad de Salamanca), Akhil Gupta (University of California), Michalis Lianos (Université de Rouen), Marco Martiniello (University of Liège), Giulio Moini (Sapienza Università di Roma), Carlotta Mozzana (Università Milano-Bicocca), Laurent Mucchielli (CNRS – Centre national de la recherche scientifique), Fabio Quassoli (Università di Milano Bicocca), Salvatore Palidda (già professore presso Università di Genova), Michel Peraldi (CADIS – Centre d'analyse et d'intervention sociologiques), Andrea Rea (Université libre de Bruxelles), Giuseppe Ricotta (Sapienza Università di Roma), Francesca Vianello (Università degli Studi di Padova)

"Cartografie sociali" is a peer reviewed journal

IL TRUMPISMO COME NUOVO MODELLO DI GOVERNO

Tra neoliberalismo e neofascismo

A cura di
Davide Borrelli, Christian Laval e Nilton Ken Ota

MIMESIS

SUOR ORSOLA
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Pubblicazione semestrale: abbonamento annuale (due numeri): € 45,00

Per gli ordini e gli abbonamenti rivolgersi a:
ordini@mimesisedizioni.it
L'acquisto avviene per bonifico intestato a:
MIM Edizioni Srl, Piazza Don Enrico Mapelli, 75
20099 – Sesto San Giovanni (MI)
Unicredit Banca – Milano
IBAN: IT 59 B 02008 01634 000101289368
BIC/SWIFT: UNCRITM1234

Cartografie sociali è una rivista promossa da URiT, Unità di Ricerca sulle Topografie sociali.

Direzione e Redazione della rivista hanno sede
presso l'Università degli Studi Suor Orsola Benincasa
Via Suor Orsola 10 – 80132 Napoli (Italy)
www.unisob.na.it
cartografiesociali@unisob.na.it
cartografiesociali.rivista@gmail.com

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI
SUOR ORSOLA
BENINCASA
FACOLTÀ DI
SCIENZE
DELLA FORMAZIONE



MIMESIS EDIZIONI (Milano – Udine)
www.mimesisedizioni.it
mimesis@mimesisedizioni.it

Isbn (Print): 9791222334xxx
Isbn (Online): 9791222334xxx
Issn: 2499-7641

This is an open access journal distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY-4.0).

© 2026 – MIM EDIZIONI SRL
Piazza Don Enrico Mapelli, 75
20099 Sesto San Giovanni (MI)
Phone: +39 02 24861657 / 21100089

Registrazione Tribunale di Napoli n. 37 del 5 luglio 2012

INDICE

Editoriale: Trumpismo e sovranità algoritmica
di Davide Borrelli, Christian Laval, Nilton Ken Ota 7

Le moment fasciste aux États-Unis: Les faits
di Fabrizio Tonello 21

Trumpism, big tech and the construction of contemporary fascism
The instrumentalization of individuals into digital soldiers
di Silvana Cristina Da Silva, *Márcio Cataia* 41

Il paleolibertarismo come fonte del trumpismo
L'autorità sociale nel libero mercato
di *Fulvia Giachetti* 61

The politics of hierarchy
Project 2025, trumpism and neoliberalism's afterlife
di Matilde Ciolli 81

Governare con le immagini
Trumpismo, cosplay politico, biopolitica dello spettacolo
e storytelling
di Giulia Crippa 107

Trumpismo
Attualità della critica del fascismo molecolare in Deleuze
e Guattari
di Roberto Ciccarelli 137

Surveillance and internal warfare in brazilian neoliberal politics
di Rômulo Ballestê Marques Dos Santos 169

Entre colonialismo e neoliberalismo
Táticas de dominacão no Brasil e na Palestina
di Dafne Melo, Jana Koosah, Priscilla Santos De Souza 195

Riprendersi lo stato per garantire diritti sociali
e tornare al progresso
di Sergio Marotta 219

DAVIDE BORRELLI, CHRISTIAN LAVAL ET NILTON KEN OTA

EDITORIAL: TRUMPISM AND ALGORITHMIC SOVEREIGNTY[1]

> I am calling «grotesque» the fact that, by virtue of their status, a discourse or an individual can have effects of power that their intrinsic qualities should disqualify them from having. [...] Ubu-esque terror, grotesque sovereignty, or, in starker terms, the maximization of effects of power on the basis of the disqualification of the one who produces them. I do not think this is an accident or mechanical failure in the history of power. It seems to me that it is one of the cogs that are an inherent part of the mechanisms of power. [...] [The grotesque] seems to me to be a way of giving a striking form of expression to the unavoidability, the inevitability of power, which can function in its full rigor and at the extreme point of its rationality even when in the hands of someone who is effectively discredited.
> M. Foucault, *Abnormal. Lectures at the* Collège de France *1974-1975,* London – New York, Verso 2003, pp. 11-13.

1. *Introduction*

Trumpism cannot be reduced to the person of President Donald Trump, though he may be regarded as grotesque, ignorant, sociopathic, and perhaps even delusional. His personality is best understood through the sensibility and imagination of surrealist

[1] Translation by Aline Lorena Tolosa.

aesthetics (Klein 2026).

Undoubtedly, it is far too early to assess the political regime and institutional order that may emerge from the exercise of Trumpist power, should it endure over time. Will this ultimately amount to a genuine regime change in the United States? At present, no one can say. However, one thing is certain: Trump reveals a shift in the way government is exercised that is neither improvised nor capricious. What does this new governmentality entail? This special issue approaches the question from a fundamentally interrogative perspective. The answer is not straightforward, particularly because we lack the necessary historical distance. The challenge is compounded by the fact that this shift in governmentality is not limited to the United States. It is a global phenomenon, driven by a reactionary wave that is sweeping across many parts of the world, including Europe. Nevertheless, the social sciences must undertake the indispensable task of diagnosing the present. Although the hypotheses we presently offer may yet prove to be incomplete or even flawed, they will at least address ongoing events rather than avoiding reflection on them.

In essence, we are asking whether this mode of governance and its extreme concentration around an «authoritarian personality» are a deliberate strategy and, if so, what that strategy might involve. Recent developments already provide a clearer picture of Trump's style of governance. He has deliberately sought to break with established U.S. foreign policy. This economic nationalism was enforced through abrupt and arbitrary increases in customs tariffs. It also seemingly signals a break with the economic order established after World War II. More broadly, the systematic dismantling of multilateralism and international law has been widely interpreted as marking a transition to a new historical era. Beyond this, a wider trend can be observed in the erosion of individual and collective freedoms through increasingly coercive laws and government practices. Not only is international law being undermined, but perhaps so too is the rule of law, or at least a fundamental aspect of what we understand by «liberal democracy».

2. *The Collapse of Democracy and Neoliberalism*

The Trump era is not merely a unique American phenomenon. In fact, it is an

exemplary instance of the worldwide erosion of advanced democracies, which has given rise to regimes described as «democratures», «competitive authoritarianisms» (Levitsky and Way 2020), or «anocracies» (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017). These are regimes in which leaders are still formally chosen through elections. However, the foundations of democratic competition, such as the independence of oversight institutions, media pluralism, and the protection of civil liberties, are steadily undermined or stripped of their substance. Indeed, the trajectory of the United States under the Trump presidency aligns with a broader trend, as evidenced by leading international indices on the state of democracy.

The Democracy Index[2], published by the Economist Intelligence Unit, recorded its lowest average score since its inception in 2006: approximately 5.17. This means that the global average now falls within the Democracy Index's «hybrid regime» category. According to the index, only twenty-five countries comprising about 6.6% of the world's population can currently be defined as «full democracies». France, the United States, Israel, Belgium, and Italy are classified as «flawed democracies». Similar findings appear in the latest report from the V-Dem Institute[3] at the University of Gothenburg. According to V-Dem, more than forty-five countries exhibited signs of democratic decline in 2024, compared to twelve countries twenty years earlier. The decline in freedom of expression is particularly significant, as it is one of the dimensions most affected by democratic regression. The 2024 annual report by Freedom House[4] notes that political rights and civil liberties have worsened in an estimated sixty-two countries, while only thirty-seven have shown improvement.

Based on this evidence, some observers have hastily concluded that neoliberalism, which has shaped Western policies since the 1960s, had run its course. Others argue that it is now more appropriate to speak of authoritarian capitalism, illiberalism, national populism, «fascist politics» (Stanley 2018), and other related terms than neoliberalism. However, a simplistic assertion such as a supposed «mortal blow to neoliberalism» (cf.

[2] https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2024/.
[3] https://www.v-dem.net/news/press-release-restrictions-to-freedom-of-expression-as-democracy-loses-ground/.
[4] https://freedomhouse.org/country/scores.

Jamieson 2025) is insufficient for analytical purposes. Neoliberalism should not be confused with the ideals of political liberalism or the free-market tenets associated with 18th- and 19th-century theories of economic liberalism. It has abandoned any naive faith in a natural order across its many incarnations.

For Michel Foucault (2005), the market, whether in its establishment or maintenance, is a matter of «governmental interventionism». More precisely, it is a political project that aims to transform society through reorganization according to the general principles of competition. This implies that the very nature of government power must also change in order to overcome any obstacles that might hinder this process.

Strategic logic under neoliberalism involved more than building markets; it also entailed reshaping institutions reshaping institutions to mirror the organizational forms of capitalist enterprise. to mirror the organizational forms of capitalist enterprise. Instead, neoliberalism sought to fuse the governmental logic of governing the population with capitalist domination of society in a deeper, more systematic, and more authoritarian manner.

In this sense, Trumpism seems less like the end of neoliberalism and more like one of its forms or evolutions. How did this mutation evolve? What doctrines and practices of neoliberalism bore the embryonic traits of the Trumpist mode of government? Do these traits bear any connection to historical fascism? Do they constitute an original form of neofascism, akin to Žižek's (2025) concept of «liberal fascism»? The articles in this special issue address these central questions, which are both genealogical and political, in great detail.

Once we acknowledge that neoliberalism has not relinquished the concept of sovereignty, but only taken it under a different guise, we must ask whether Trumpism represents a new type of sovereignty. More precisely, is it ushering in a genuine «algorithmic sovereignty», that is, a form of rule capable of melding the most unrestrained and unequal forms of digital hypercapitalism with an illiberal concentration of power, thereby evoking scenarios associated with real socialism?

3. *A New Version of Sovereignty*

Understanding this novelty requires attention to a fundamental aspect of neoliberal normative logic. If the state is to serve as the architect and guardian of markets, it must, itself, be organized along the lines of the enterprise. This premise rests on a fundamental assumption: in a capitalist market economy, the sovereign is stripped of a classic attribute of power, namely knowledge. As Hayek (1988) and later Mises argued, neoliberal doctrine is grounded in a theory of knowledge.

The neoliberal approach to governance involves delegating the responsibility of regulating a sizable portion of social life to the market, while ensuring the effective operation of market regulatory mechanisms, even if this requires the use of potentially brutal methods. The rationale behind this approach is that knowledge should not be entirely concentrated in the hands of a central authority. This conception is not entirely new, as Foucault shows.

Foucault is widely known for providing a genealogy of the neoliberal turn of the neoliberal turn that established the market as the site of political veridiction. However, his analysis may overemphasize the market's ability to supersede *raison d'état* and dissolve absolute sovereignty. Yet, from a historical perspective, one cannot say that the market has truly banished sovereign power. Consider, for example, the fateful alliance between Milton Friedman's "Chicago Boys" and the Pinochet regime (Moini 2020). For the purposes of our argument, it is useful to follow the line of reasoning that led Foucault to identify the following tendency:

> *Homo oeconomicus* is someone who can say to the juridical sovereign, to the sovereign possessor of rights and founder of positive law on the basis of the natural right of individuals: You must not. But he does not say: You must not, because I have rights and you must not touch them. This is what the man of right, *homo juridicus*, says to the sovereign: I have rights, I have entrusted some of them to you, the others you must not touch, or: I have entrusted you with my rights for a particular end. *Homo oeconomicus* does not say this. He also tells the sovereign: You must not. But why must he not? You must not

> because you cannot. And you cannot in the sense that 'you are powerless.' And why are you powerless, why can't you? You cannot because you do not know, and you do not know because you cannot know. (Foucault 2008, p. 282).

The transformation of *raison d'état* is not attributed to a political or moral prohibition, nor to an externally imposed legal limit (as encapsulated by the German verb *dürfen*, meaning "to be able" in the sense of having 'permission to do something'). Instead, it stems from an inherent epistemic limitation of *raison d'état* itself, namely its inability to grasp the complex web of interests, preferences, and human relations (in German, *können*, "to be able" in the sense of having the "capacity to do something"). The market thus emerges as a mechanism for revealing dispersed information and, consequently, as a site of political veridiction, precisely where the absolute sovereign falls short. The underlying assumption is that there is no central decision-maker; therefore, it is better to trust the spontaneous mechanisms of the market.

Foucault's analysis of neoliberalism shows how market competition is rationalized as a means of regulating society because the state lacks the requisite knowledge to govern, something traditionally regarded as an inherent attribute of sovereign power. However, data capitalism now claims the ability to overcome this limitation, whether rightly or wrongly. If the sovereign's lack of power stems from an informational and cognitive incapacity rather than a prohibition, then the governance of society might once again converge in a single monopolistic center of knowledge and power. This would be possible if this limitation can be overcome, or if governments believe it can.

This narrative legitimizes the promise of disruption resulting from the alignment of interests between Donald Trump and certain Silicon Valley technology companies. Big data and artificial intelligence now offer algorithmic solutions to the problems of economic planning and complex social systems through pervasive predictive control technologies. The United States widely employs these technologies to track down and deport undocumented immigrants as part of security policies directed against the domestic enemy and to conduct "surgical" bombings in wars against the external enemy. Equipped with sophisticated data analytics and digital intelligence systems, the sovereign

once again seems omnipotent and, consequently, absolute.

It is not surprising that this image of sovereignty emerges explicitly in Donald Trump's self-representation. In an interview published by *The New York Times* on January 8, 2026[5], Trump said the only constraint to his power is «My own morality. My own mind. It's the only thing that can stop me», adding that he doesn't «need international law».

However, this does not mean that algorithmic governmentality necessarily leads to a recentralization of power. The digital infrastructures on which it relies are often controlled by private actors that enjoy a degree of strategic autonomy. These actors are capable of evading the directives of political power, at least in principle. For example, Anthropic refused to remove the safeguards preventing its AI systems from being used for mass domestic surveillance or the development of lethal autonomous weapons in accordance with the principles set out in its AI Safety Charter. Consequently, Trump accused the company of being a haven for "left-wing extremists" and revoked all its contracts with the Pentagon on the grounds that it posed a "supply-chain risk," that is, a risk to military procurement and supply operations. This controversy reveals how artificial intelligence technologies have the potential to multiply decision-making centers and challenge the centralization of sovereignty. As such, algorithmic sovereignty emerges as a structurally ambivalent domain in which dynamics of centralization and processes of power fragmentation coexist.

From this perspective, it is worth taking a closer look at figures such as Peter Thiel. Described as the «dark soul of Silicon Valley» by Luca Ciarrocca, author of the first Italian monograph on Thiel (2026), he plays a significant role in the centralization of state power examined here. He founded startups such as PayPal and Palantir Technologies and is a prominent embodiment of the relationship between neoliberalism and Trumpism that we seek to examine in this special issue.

He is also notable for his views on the sovereignty of digital infrastructure, as discussed by Benjamin Bratton (2015), and for the ways in which his activities exemplify the dynamics of surveillance capitalism (Zuboff 2019) and fragmentation capitalism (Slobodian 2023). According to Thiel, democracy is no longer necessary, and

[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/08/us/politics/trump-interview-power-morality.html

competition, which was once the foundation of neoliberalism, o become little more than a pursuit for losers, as Thiel himself argued in a well-known article published in the Wall Street Journal (Thiel 2014)[6]. He argues that competition ultimately erodes the profit margins of participating companies, and only a monopoly based on a unique, disruptive idea will lead to real success. This perspective stems from a broader historical-philosophical analysis of Western modernity, set out by Thiel in his essay *The Straussian Moment* (2007), and is not limited to the political economy of innovation. As a devoted follower of René Girard, Thiel interprets the attacks on the Twin Towers as a manifestation of a new phase of global mimetic violence. For Thiel, the attack was a watershed moment because of the failure of security policies to prevent it and because it exposed the obsolescence of the neoliberal social order. Post-traumatic shock from Islamic terrorism and the clash of civilizations has led Western societies to view the world differently and, in his words, «thereby to awaken from that very long and profitable period of intellectual slumber and amnesia that is so misleadingly called the Enlightenment». (Thiel 2007, p. 198)[7]. Thiel argues that this period was in fact a period of obscurity, where questions about what it means to be human, along with the "things hidden since the foundation of the world", were mistakenly neglected in the pursuit of well-being and economic success.

Thiel's analysis of Lockean liberalism, which underpins American political culture, echoes Foucault's explanation of the factors that dismantled the authority of the absolute sovereign in favor of impersonal market mechanisms. In both cases, liberalism stems from the epistemological premise that the totality of nature and human affairs is unknowable and, consequently, ungovernable. Thiel expresses this idea as follows:

> This awareness of ignorance provides the low but solid ground on which the American Founding takes place. The human "X" may have certain wants and preferences, but nobody is in an authoritative position from which to challenge those desires.? And so, in a somewhat paradoxical manner, the

[6] https://www.wsj.com/articles/peter-thiel-competition-is-for-losers-1410535536
[7] https://gwern.net/doc/politics/2007-thiel.pdf

> unknowability of “X” leads to classic liberalism and the very strong assertion of the different rights that belong to that unknowable “X”: the freedom of religion, for we cannot ever know what people are truly thinking in the temple of their minds; the freedom of speech, for we cannot irrefutably criticize the way people express themselves; the right to property and commerce, for we cannot second-guess what people will do with the they possess. (Thiel 2007, p. 196)

Thiel invokes the «Straussian moment» in opposition to the agnostic premise concerning the knowability of human nature, which he considers intrinsic to liberalism. In other words, he uses this concept to reject the relativist and nihilist premises that, in his view, underlie the free market. Leo Strauss, a highly regarded philosopher in American neoconservative circles, is central to Thiel's thought because he affirms the existence of a truth about human nature and maintains «that this truth can in principle be known» (Thiel 2007, p. 205). Notably, the same principle underlies the vision set out in The Technological Republic by Palantir co-founder and CEO Alexander Karp (Karp and Zamiska, 2025). Karp criticizes Silicon Valley's tendency to cater to consumers' most trivial everyday needs rather than serve the interests of national security and the state's “true” prerogatives.

> The prevailing agnosticism of the contemporary era, the reluctance to advance a substantive view about cultural value, or lack thereof, for fear of alienating anyone, has paved the way for the market to fill the gap. The drift of the technology world to the concerns of the consumer both reflected and helped reinforce a kind of technological escapism.” (Karp and Zamiska 2025, p. 172)

Palantir, the fullest expression of Thiel and Karp’s economic project, clearly represents the technological realization of their political-philosophical program. Its name is particularly evocative: Thiel borrowed it from the eponymous «seeing stones», the indestructible crystal spheres of Tolkien’s imagination, capable of telepathic

communication and of observing distant places. Palantir now operates not merely as a technological platform capable of cross-referencing heterogeneous data streams and uncovering hidden connections, but as a veritable governmental and «alethurgical» infrastructure (cf. Foucault 2014, pp. 18-19).

In the version of neoliberalism whose genealogy Foucault traced, the market functioned as a site of verification because knowledge was dispersed among a multiplicity of actors. By contrast, contemporary systems of aggregated data analysis, such as those developed by Palantir, promise to collect that dispersed knowledge and channel it back to a single center of computation and decision-making. It is well known that Thiel conceived the idea of an automated intelligence system while reflecting on the extant intelligence services' failure to analyze the data that could have made it possible to anticipate and thwart the September 11 attacks. All the necessary information was available, from entry visas issued to Saudi citizens under investigation for radicalization, to suspicious financial transfers, to flight training courses attended by students with no interest in learning how to land an aircraft. The source of Palantir's early funding was, quite fittingly, the CIA, through its venture capital arm, In-Q-Tel.

Luca Ciarrocca summarizes how the engines at the core of Palantir operate: «They collect disordered data streams—records, sensors, videos, and metadata—and make them interact in real time, thereby transforming the raw data into maps, priorities, and actions. It is an 'apparatus of power', a machine that gives its users the strategic advantage of seeing farther and acting sooner» (Ciarrocca 2026, p. 107, authors' translation). Thiel's ambition was therefore radical. Through the system he envisioned, the truth of the world would no longer remain opaque and inaccessible because it was dispersed across the unpredictable interactions of myriad facts and individuals. Instead, it would be concentrated in a single locus of knowledge and power. The neo-sovereign and their digital court would thus possess what the absolute sovereign could never truly attain: virtually total knowledge of reality. The *capacity* to access reality (in the sense of *können*) eliminates every obstacle to *exercising unchallenged dominion* (in the sense of *dürfen*) over it. In this sense, Trumpism can be understood as a strategic mutation in which market logic, originally conceived as a means of distributing knowledge and power, is reoriented through technological and algorithmic instruments into a new architecture of sovereignty.

4. *A Government of Total War*

As a specific mode of governance, Trumpism carries forward the neoliberal project of subjecting society as a whole to the logic of private interests through increasingly violent forms of intervention. In this context, “society” encompasses everything within the reach of its economic, financial, military, and ideological power. More precisely, this mode of governance mobilizes all the instruments at its disposal to wage a war that is both internal and external.

These practices can be described as "neofascist" because they operate within a logic of «civil war» (Dardot, Guéguen, Laval, and Sauvêtre 2023). In the United States, violence perpetrated by ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) against migrants, legal action taken against political opponents, and the threats that are made against all of them help produce enemies to be crushed, just like the war of destruction waged alongside Israel against Iran and the trade wars directed against many other countries.

Trumpism does not seek to establish a consensus, preserve a *status quo*, or consolidate a hegemony. Nor does it merely seek to preserve an existing order. Rather, it is oriented toward victory over enemies who must be terrorized and annihilated. To achieve this, it must seize all the levers of power, transform institutions, and place them at the service of total mobilization. The exercise of power corresponds to a phase of «totalization of the state», in the sense defined by Carl Schmitt (2007), for whom the true total state is guided by a sovereign who possesses both the will and the means to mobilize and deploy every instrument, including force, in order to impose their decisions, especially in exceptional circumstances. This is what we find in the ideology of the “unitary executive” which is integral to Trumpism and to the proliferation of executive orders. Such an executive must be powerful enough to subdue the legislative branch, instrumentalize the judiciary, and, at the same time, mobilize the most powerful forces in the technological and economic spheres.

The «total mobilization» of technology (Jünger 1985) is unfolding before our eyes. Digital platforms, cryptocurrencies, the media, and artificial intelligence are subjugated and serve both as instruments of wealth accumulation and as means of surveillance and

social control.

In this new architecture of power, large capitalist corporations have become key instruments of total war in return for unlimited regulatory exemptions. If neoliberalism holds that the state should be governed like a corporation by an omnipotent leader, then large corporations, beginning with Big Tech and including Palantir, are integrated into the vast apparatus of total war constitutive of algorithmic sovereignty, whether in the form of symmetric warfare against Iran or asymmetric warfare against the Palestinians.

5. *How the Special Issue is Organized: From Facts to Interpretations*

This issue of *Cartografie Sociali* is the result of an international scholarly collaboration among researchers from Italy, Brazil, and France. It is organized as a sequence of articles that begins with two contributions devoted, respectively, to reconstructing the specific events and the technological context in which the algorithmic sovereignty of Trumpism emerged. The first article, by Fabrizio Tonello, examines Donald Trump's second term as a possible «fascist moment» in the United States. Drawing on Jason Stanley's distinction between fascist politics and a genuine fascist regime, Tonello examines several authoritarian features of the Trumpian regime, including the repression of immigration, restrictions on press freedom, the persecution of political opponents, the concentration of executive power, and alliances with tech oligarchs such as Elon Musk. On the international stage, Trump is clearly breaking with the postwar liberal order by adopting expansionist policies and diminishing the role of European allies. Nevertheless, the courts, civil society, and popular mobilizations continue to constrain some of the administration's initiatives. The central question that remains is whether U.S. democratic institutions will be able to prevent an oligarchic and authoritarian turn.

In their article, Silvana Cristina da Silva and Marcio Antonio Cataia argue that Trumpism represents a new form of digital fascism emerging from the alliance between the U.S. government and Big Tech. Major platforms collect data and shape behavior through laws such as the CLOUD Act and through their control over digital infrastructure, transforming users into «digital soldiers». Algorithms, social media, and disinformation fuel fear, hatred, and the construction of artificial enemies, while neoliberalism fosters

competitive and isolated individuals. Sovereignty no longer depends solely on territory but also on control over data and cognitive infrastructures. The authors argue that defending democracy requires digital autonomy and «cognitive armament».

Next are two articles that analyze the ideological and cultural sources of the Trump phenomenon. Fulvia Giachetti argues that paleolibertarianism is one of the deepest ideological roots of Trumpism and reconstructs its genealogy. Emerging from the convergence of anarcho-capitalism and paleoconservatism, this movement advocates an unfettered free market, hostility toward social democracy, and the preservation of traditional cultural hierarchies. Thinkers such as Rothbard and Hoppe regard the democratic state as oppressive and promote societies founded on private property, homogeneous communities, and social authority. These ideas continue to influence the American *tech right*, from Peter Thiel to Curtis Yarvin. The essay concludes that Trumpism does not break with neoliberalism but rather represents its authoritarian, ethno-nationalist, and technoreactionary radicalization.

Matilde Ciolli's essay examines the connections and differences between neoliberalism and Trumpism through the lens of *Project 2025*, the Heritage Foundation’s plan to institutionalize MAGA ideology. By comparing *Project 2025*'s proposals regarding family, welfare, immigration, education, and presidential power to the ideas of neoliberal theorists such as Milton Friedman, Gary Becker, and George Gilder, Ciolli demonstrates that American neoliberalism was rooted in a hierarchical view of society. According to this conception, patriarchal family structures, racial inequalities, and labor discipline were justified as necessary conditions to ensure market functionality. *Project 2025* merely radicalizes this legacy by blending welfare cuts, deregulation, and assaults on egalitarian policies with Christian nationalism, immigration repression, and an authoritarian concentration of executive power.

The following two articles offer interpretive readings of Trumpism from mediological and philosophical perspectives, respectively. The first contribution, by Giulia Crippa, interprets Trumpism as the ultimate manifestation of Guy Debord’s «society of the spectacle» and Neil Postman’s mediological critique. In this reading, politics becomes performance, history becomes storytelling, and argument becomes emotion. From this perspective, political cosplay, the spectacularization of the leader’s body, and

disinformation are not anomalies but structural devices of governance. The comparison with Bolsonaro, Milei, Orbán, and Berlusconi reveals the transnational dimension of this model, in which weakness appears as an aesthetic failure and success as the sole deity.

The second contribution, by Roberto Ciccarelli, applies the Deleuzian-Guattarian concept of «molecular fascism» to Trumpism. Rather than a dictatorial regime, Trumpism is conceived as a diffuse process that permeates democratic institutions, social relations, and subjectivities, fueled by the desires of the masses themselves. Ciccarelli defines Trumpism as an «exceptional form of the capitalist state», an authoritarian market populism that brings together individualistic, religious, sexist, and racial forms of molecular fascism without necessarily leading to dictatorship. Its novelty in relation to historical fascism lies in the fact that it operates through capital rather than the state, producing racist and patriarchal subjectivities as forms of human capital. In response to this process, Félix Guattari proposed practices of «disaggregation» and «rhizomatization» of subjectivity as a molecular antidote.

The special issue concludes with two contributions that examine “globalized Trumpism”, exploring how the Trump model has been adapted and applied in the Brazilian and Palestinian contexts. The first, by Rômulo Ballestê Marques dos Santos, begins with the observation that mass digital surveillance has become a central instrument of contemporary neoliberal politics. Intelligence agencies and major technology platforms collect vast amounts of personal data to construct psychosocial profiles capable of influencing political and electoral behavior. Edward Snowden's revelations exposed the extent to which surveillance programs monitored foreign citizens and political leaders, including former Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff. The article links these techniques to the spread of disinformation through WhatsApp and electoral microtargeting, arguing that they contributed to Jair Bolsonaro's victory in 2018. According to the author, the use of big data, psychometric profiling, and personalized campaigns reinforces neoliberal, populist, and anti-democratic tendencies, jeopardizing the quality of democracy and turning citizens into objects of surveillance and political manipulation.

The issue concludes with an article by Dafne Melo, Jana Koosah, and Priscilla Santos de Souza that compares Brazil and Palestine through the lens of settler colonialism. The authors show how both contexts are shaped by logics of territorial control and the

elimination of groups perceived as internal threats. They argue that contemporary neoliberalism has become increasingly authoritarian and relies on the construction of racialized enemies in order to justify militarization, repression, and the suspension of rights. In Palestine, this takes the form of Israeli occupation, apartheid, and genocidal practices directed against the Palestinian population. In Brazil, by contrast, the "war on drugs" operates as an instrument of social and territorial control directed primarily against Black and poor populations. Despite their historical differences, the two contexts share similar mechanisms, ranging from the construction of internal enemies and the permanent invocation of security as a principle of governance to the militarization of everyday life and the unequal governance of life and death. The authors argue that these dynamics reveal the continuity between colonialism, neoliberalism, and new forms of global authoritarianism.